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Abstract

Irregular warfare and insurgencies have been on the rise since the end of World War II. A
particularly strong example of these conflicts is the ongoing conflict between the Lebanese
Hezbollah and the state of Israel. In the course of the conflict, Hezbollah was able to accomplish
what other; more powerful Arab states could not: Hezbollah forced Israel to unilaterally end a
conflict. How did Hezbollah accomplish this? This thesis will provide a qualitative analysis of
Hezbollah’s use of the instruments of power in their irregular warfare strategy against Israel
during the occupation of southern Lebanon.
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Section 1: Introduction
The end of the Second World War gave rise to a new phase in the history of the world
and in the international system—decolonization and the Cold War. These two phenomena
created an international situation that produced both ideological conflicts and the continued,
widespread use of violence for political objectives. These new conflicts would not be highintensity, conventional conflicts utilizing massive amounts of infantry, armor, and support, both
artillery and air, conducted on miles of battlefield, these conflicts would instead be irregular,
asymmetric conflicts, where a significantly weaker side would fight a significantly stronger force
through the use of irregular warfare. Irregular war would also not be solely between states,
irregular war would often be between a state and the disgruntled population of that state or
between a disgruntled population and a foreign state.
These conflicts, known under the umbrella term “small wars,” are not unique to the postWorld War II and post-Cold War international system, but they are beginning to have a greater
impact on international and national security for states that are not directly involved in the
conflict. At one time these conflicts would not have had a major impact on other states, but in
the information and globalization age, these conflicts are no longer regional or domestic
conflicts. Persistent irregular warfare now has the ability to impact both the surrounding states
and distant states—arms are generally acquired from international sources, safe havens are
provided in neighboring states, and as seen on September 11th and the 2008 Mumbai attacks,
operations can be devised, orchestrated, and launched from either neighboring states or states on
the other side of the planet. In addition, small wars can lead to substantial spill-over violence
into other states; increase tension between neighboring states as in the case of Colombia and
Venezuela; and can ultimately lead to state failure, which can lead to perpetual civil war and
violence.
1

Small wars do not have a steadfast definition nor a single term. C.E. Calwell in Small
Wars: Their Principles and Practice gives small wars a practical definition—“all campaigns
other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops.”1 Calwell even went so
far as to point out that small wars have nothing to do with the size of the campaign and that it
simply denotes operations of a regular army against irregular forces. The U.S. Marine Corp.
Small Wars Manual defines small wars as:
…a vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations…small wars are
operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with
diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government
is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests
as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.2
Roger Beaumont in his contribution to The Annals of The American Academy of Political and
Social Science’s volume on Small Wars titled Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions lists all
the names small wars have been called: “brushfire wars,” “dirty wars,” “guerilla wars,”
“insurgency-counterinsurgency,” “internal wars,” “interventions,” “expeditions,” “limited wars,”
“little wars,” “low-intensity operations/conflicts,” “political warfare,” “revolutionary warfare,”
“urban guerilla warfare,” “proxy wars,” and “surrogate wars.”3
These small wars are generally conducted through irregular warfare (IW). Irregular
warfare is defined in the Army Manual FM 3-05.130 as “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other
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C.E. Calwell, Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice 3rd ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1996), 21.
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The U.S Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual—United States Marine Corps, 1940 (Washington, DC,
1940), 1. Accessed Mar. 5, 2012. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/index.htm.
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Roger Beaumont, “Small Wars: Definitions and Dimensions,” in Small Wars, ed. Wm. J. Olson, Vol. 541
of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, ed. Richard D. Lambert and Alan W.
Heston (Thousand Oaks: Sage Periodicals Press, 1995), 23.
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capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”4 The FM 3-05.130
continues by listing the activities that can be used in irregular warfare: Insurgency, COIN
(counterinsurgency), UW (unconventional warfare), terrorism, counterterrorism, FID (foreign
internal defense), stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations, strategic
communications, PSYOP (psychological operations), civil-military operations (CMO),
information operations (OP), intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) activities, transnational
criminal activities, including narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, and illegal financial
transactions that support of sustain IW, law enforcement activities focused on countering
irregular adversaries.5
As seen in the previous examples, irregular warfare is at its core a political endeavor,
supported through multiple avenues including military, diplomacy, information, and economics.
Military force can be used to demonstrate the impotence of the government or information
warfare campaign can be used to show the corruption and delegitimize a government. Economic
actions can influence target populations by either buying loyalty or can improve their lives
resulting in greater loyalty to the group that provided the support. It is a completion for the
“hearts and minds” of a population, which without the consent of the population, a government is
weakened and more susceptible to being overthrown—and “hearts and minds” can be won
through multiple means. The following illustration (Figure 1.1) from FM 3-05.130 compares
conventional warfare to irregular warfare.

4

The U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130: Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare
(Washington, DC, 2008), 1-4, 1-5. http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf.
5

FM 3-05.130, 1-5.
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Figure 1.1: Contrasting conventional and irregular warfare 6

Conventional warfare is used to influence a government. This focus is on the defeat of
the military and not the population compared to irregular warfare where the focus is on
manipulating the support of the population, not the military. The key to victory in irregular
warfare is to convince the population that your side is the better side to be on, not the enemies.
In order to convey this message to the population, each side, whether state or non-state, use the
instruments of power—Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economics—also known as the
DIME.
These instruments of power are used either in concert with each or solo, but the ultimate
goal is to create an atmosphere in the international system that is conducive to the policy goals of
a state. These instruments are not solely under the purview of states and they can be utilized by
non-state actors as well. While the instruments use is more geared towards states, the ability to

6
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project power through the DIME is universal. In the international and national systems, power is
a universal goal.
In understanding how Hezbollah was successful in forcing Israel out of Lebanon, this
paper will demonstrate how Hezbollah used the DIME to formulate an irregular warfare strategy
against Israel. The theory behind this project is that Hezbollah is an example of the successful
application of hybrid warfare against Israel. Their use of hybrid warfare is governed by the
instruments of power, the DIME. An analysis of Hezbollah’s use of the DIME in their war
against Israel will produce insight into how the organization successfully uses the DIME and the
strengths and weaknesses of Hezbollah. The theoretical foundation for this project is made up of
multiple suppositions. These suppositions are as follows:
1. Hezbollah is an irregular force, influenced by irregular warfare theory.
2. Hezbollah uses its fighting force to wage an irregular warfare campaign against Israel.
3. While Hezbollah is an irregular force, it has demonstrated the successful use and
blending of both irregular and conventional warfare, in what is known as hybrid warfare.
4. Hezbollah utilizes the instruments of power, the DIME, in their formation of strategy
against Israel.
5. Hezbollah uses irregular warfare, governed by their DIME-based strategy, to weaken
Israel, both militarily and politically, in accordance with Hezbollah’s strategic objectives.
Non-state actors have the ability to conduct diplomacy with other states or even other
non-state actors to acquire support either materially or geographically; the dispersion of
information in favor of the non-state actor that is detrimental to its adversary is a key part of
irregular warfare; non-state actors projecting military power is also a key aspect of irregular
warfare; and non-state use of economics, while not as powerful as a state, can erode the
economic base of a state by supporting the delinquency of tax payments, flooding markets
(material and financial) with counterfeit goods, supporting drug trafficking, and promoting other

5

forms of organized crime. Essentially, no successful irregular war fighting organization or state
could be successful in pursuit of their interests without a detailed plan for the use of the aspects
of the DIME. It is through the lens of the DIME, that this work will analyze Hezbollah’s use of
irregular warfare against Israel.
Hezbollah, the Party of God, is a violent non-state actor. 7 Hezbollah is a Shi’a Muslim
organization that was formed with the support, and is still supported, by Syria, whose ruling alAssad family comes from the Alawi sect of Shi’a Islam and also from Iran, the world’s only
Shi’a Islamic state. Hezbollah was formed as a response to the 1982 invasion of southern
Lebanon by Israel. Hezbollah is a not only a major violent actor within Lebanon and the Middle
East, it has also achieved legitimacy within Lebanon by being an active participant in elections,
in which Hezbollah has won seats in the Lebanese Parliament. The potency of Hezbollah has
only increased through their creation in 1982 with the aid of Iran and Syria. Hezbollah claimed
credit for causing the 2000 Israeli pullout of southern Lebanon and was part of the 33-day June
2006 war with Israel—an event that showed Hezbollah had not only grown politically, but it had
grown militarily from simple guerilla tactics to waging near-conventional warfare. Hezbollah
has become a pseudo-state situated in southern Lebanon and more ominously has become the
very model of a “resistance organization” with a global support system.
1.1 Literature Review
As there are multiple concepts that make up the theoretical background of this thesis, the
literature review will be broken up into multiple sections covering relevant literature on
Hezbollah, the DIME, Hybrid Warfare, and Irregular Warfare Theory. The section on Hezbollah

7

Transliterated from Arabic, the Party of God can be written multiple ways including Hizbullah, Hizbollah,
Hizb’llah, and Hezbollah. The author will use Hezbollah unless citing material that utilizes a different spelling.
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literature will also contain pertinent information on the organization’s ideology, structure, and
goals.
1.1.1 Hezbollah
Hezbollah defines itself as an Islamic jihadi (struggle) organization.8 In their 1985
document, Hezbollah’s Open Letter Addressed to the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World,
Hezbollah declared their loyalty to the walih al-fiqah and the three central beliefs of the
organization—allegiance to the walih al-fiqah, belief in Islam, and jihad:
We, the sons of Hizbullah’s umma, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran and
which has established the nucleus of the world’s central Islamic state, abide by the orders
of a single, wise and just command represented by the guardianship of the jurisprudent
(waliyy al-faqih), currently embodied in the supreme Ayatullah Ruhallah al-Musawi alKhumayni…we in Lebanon are neither a closed organizational party nor a narrow
political framework. Rather, we are an umma tied to the Muslims in every part of the
world by a strong ideological-doctrinal and political bond, namely, Islam…No one can
estimate our military capabilities since our military apparatus is part and parcel of our
society of resistance. Thus, each and every one of us is a combatant when the call of
jihad demands it, and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with the
“legitimate and religious responsibility of the Wilayat al-Faqih.9
1.1.1.2 Islam
Hezbollah’s founding pillar is the belief in Islam. This is not simply the belief that
Mohammed was the final prophet and that the Quran is the final world of God, but that Islam is a
way of life and an ultimate, and serves as the basis for a, divinely ordained system of
government. Naim Qassem provides examples of Islam’s comprehensiveness—the belief in
God, worship, self-discipline, concern for politics, Jihad (struggle) in the name of God,
economics, social responsibility, the use of reason and refusal of subordination, communication,
justice, and piety.10 Qassem states the following:

8

Joseph Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 61.
9

Alagha, 40.
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Islam is both worship and a policy applicable for both life and the afterlife, relevant to the
individual and society, the mosque and the ruling authority, calling for mercy and
firmness, jihad and peace…in everything he does, man is concerned with looking after
God’s orders and forbiddances, for there is no circle to which God has not entered and
which is solely left for the individual to shape. Even that space which was left by the
Creator to man is also within the realm of the organized circle of life, and is governed by
the fixed general rules of the sacred Shari’a.11
This belief in Islam as the perfect system of government, dictated to and implemented in the
world through the Prophet Mohammed, is a key to Hezbollah’s relationship with the Islamic
Republic of Iran and their model of government based on the Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini’s
theory of the guardianship of the jurist, the Walih al-Faqih.
1.1.1.3 Wali al-Faqih12
Hezbollah’s ideology is founded in the ideology of the Iranian Revolution and the
Ayatollah Ruhallah (“the spirit of Allah”) Khomeini. The Ayatollah Khomeini’s major
theological doctrine was the establishment of al-wali al-fiqah, the guardianship of the jurist.
Wali translates to guardian or custodian and fiqah is a jurist or religious scholar.
In Shi’a Islam, specifically the Twelver sect of Shi’a Islam, when the Prophet
Mohammed died, Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, should have been the rightful
successor in leading the newly formed Muslim community, the Umma. Ali would eventually
lead, but only as the last of the Four Rightly-Guided Caliphs, the previous three—Abu Bakr,
Omar, and Othman, were either chosen by ijma (consensus) or appointed as successor. Twelver
Muslims believe that Ali and his descendants, the Ahl al-Bayt (the people of the house) should
have been the rightful leaders of the Umma after the Prophet’s death, this is the cause of the split

10

Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, trans. by Dalia Khalil (Beirut: Saqi, 2010), 68-75.

11

Qassem, 75-76.

12

wali al-faqih is also written al-wali al-fiqah, walih al-faqih or valayat-e Faqih in Farsi. In Farsi, the
Arabic letter waa is pronounced vaa.
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between Sunni, those who follow the path, the Sunnah, of the Prophet, and the Shi’a, a short
version of the phrase “shi’atu Ali,”—followers of Ali.
Believing Ali was the rightful successor, the Shi’a gave him the title of Imam. The Shi’a
use of Imam is conceptually and theologically different from the Sunni use of Imam. In Sunni
Islam, the Imam is the prayer leader while in Shi’a Islam, there exist a certain number of Imams
(different sects have different numbers, including Fivers and Seveners) who “as the Prophet’s
legitimate successors, bear the responsibility of guarding and preserving Muhammad’s divine
message. Unlike the Caliph, who is a political leader designated, at least theoretically, by the
consensus of the Muslim community, the Imam represents the spiritual authority of the Prophet
Muhammad and is designated by God through the fact of his birth…the Shi’ite Imam…is
endowed with the living spirit of the Prophet and, as such, is thought to possess a spiritual
authority that sets him above any earthly ruler.”13 In Twlever Islam, there have been twelve
Imams, the first eleven were killed and particular prominence is given to Husayn, the Prophet’s
grandson, who opposed Caliph Yazid I’s legitimacy, and was killed (martyred) at the Battle of
Karbala in 680 A.D. The twelfth and final Imam, Muhammad ibn al-Hassan, also known as the
“Mahdi” or Guided One, was removed by God and placed into seclusion, known as the Great
Occultation, where he will wait until it is time for him to usher in the Day of Judgment along
with Jesus.
Khomeini’s theory was based on his belief that an Islamic republic was needed.14 This
Islamic state, governed by Shari’a, could only be led by someone who is a qualified, expert on
Shari’a, thus an expert on Islamic jurisprudence—the faqih. Khomeini believed that the depth of

13

Reza Aslan, No god but God: the origins, evolution, and future of Islam (New York: Random House,
2005), 181.
14

Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion (Sterling: Pluto Press, 2002), 59.

9

knowledge required to be a qualified jurist enabled these jurist to act with both the religious and
political authority of the Prophet Mohammed and the Imams during the Great Occultation.
Khomeini believed that the jurists (fuqaha, the plural of faqih) should “concern themselves with
the ‘political, economic and legal problems of Islam’ rather than to focus exclusively on ‘ritual
matters’, as had been the case in the past.” At the head of the fuqaha, would be the Faqih as the
leader of the Islamic state and the most qualified jurist. The faqih is not infallible and does not
have spiritual power, in contrast to the Pope of the Catholic Church. Infallibility rests only with
the Prophet Mohammed and the Imams. The faqih has religious and temporal power, but not
spiritual power. The Faqih is supposed to be the legitimate successor of Mohammed and the
Prophets on Earth.
Hezbollah’s allegiance is to the position and concept of the wali al-fiqah, while Khomeini
holds a special significance within Hezbollah, upon his death the organization acknowledged and
accepted the promotion of Ali Khamenei as the new Faqih. This allegiance is not to the wali alfaqih as a political position within the Islamic Republic “…the party’s commitment to the
Wilayat does not represent a ‘political’ commitment to a national head of state. It is an
‘intellectual’ commitment to a sacred Islamic figure and his successors whose commands are
considered ‘fixed truths.’” Hezbollah’s deputy secretary-general Naim Qassem states that the
Faqih’s authority is “confined to strategic issues such as jihad, political rule and the
classification of ‘friends and enemies.’” As a result, the Faqih dictates who Hezbollah can
consider friends and who are enemies; Hezbollah required the Faqih’s allowance to participate in
the 1992 elections; and the Faqih permitted the use of suicide attacks. Thus, the Supreme Leader

10

of Iran’s influence on Hezbollah is mainly limited to major strategic guidance, where day-to-day
functional decisions are left to the leadership of Hezbollah.15
1.1.1.4 Jihad
The last and final pillar of Hezbollah’s belief system is jihad. Jihad is the much
discussed and overly-simplified concept of holy struggle in the name of God. Ahmad Nizar
Hamzeh in his work, In the Path of Hizbullah, explains Hezbollah’s jihad ideology. For
Hezbollah, jihad is a broad term encompassing multiple forms, as Hamzeh cites Hezbollah
leadership “jihad is demonstrated labor and energy in confronting or standing up to the enemy,
for the purpose of defeating him and achieving the goals set by God.”16 Hamzeh considers this
broad definition of jihad to permit the use of two major modes of jihad and two sub modes of
jihad.
1.1.1.4.1 Greater Jihad
Greater jihad is the least discussed aspect of jihad in Western media. Greater jihad is the
inner, personal struggle a person has within himself, as Hamzeh cites Shaykh Naim Qassem,
Hezbollah’s deputy secretary-general, discussing greater jihad as “placing one’s powers and
faculties under the yoke of Allah’s commands and purging the domain of one’s body of satanic
elements and their forces.”17 Greater jihad is supposed to be a continuous struggle that a person
cannot ever truly win. As Qassem explains in Hizbullah: The Story from Within, “Islam
considers jihad to be a basic behavior in a Muslim’s life, be that a jihad with one’s soul or a
struggle against the enemy…Jihad with the soul is the larger of the two challenges, as it is a

15

16

17

The above is found in Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion , 59-67.
Ahmed Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 36.
Hamzeh, 37.
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daily and permanent struggle, present in any conflict between virtue and vice, between obedience
to God and to the soul’s impulses.18 Figure 1.2 demonstrates jihad’s nature.
1.1.1.4.2 Lesser Jihad
Lesser jihad is broken into two sub modes: elementary jihad and defensive jihad.
Elementary jihad is the widely acknowledged meaning of jihad—holy war. This is the form of
jihad espoused by Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Elementary jihad is the spread of Islam
across the world by force. However, Hezbollah believes that only Mohammed or the infallible
Imam can authorize the use of elementary jihad, as the former is deceased and the latter is in a
state of occultation, Hezbollah cannot be authorized to wage elementary jihad. In elementary
jihad’s place, Hezbollah wages the second sub mode of jihad—defensive jihad.

Sub modes
1. Elementary Jihad
2. Defensive Jihad
a. Armed Jihad
b. Unarmed Jihad

Major Modes
1. Greater Jihad
2. Lesser Jihad

Figure 1.2: Hizbullah’s Circles of Jihad19

18

Qassem, 90.

19

Recreation found in Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 36.
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Defensive jihad is waged in defense of one’s life, country, and more importantly, in
defense of the umma, the Islamic community. Hamzeh points out that defensive jihad does not
require the authorization of Mohammed or the Hidden Imam, but the wali al-fiqah is permitted to
authorize use of defensive jihad. Hezbollah, using Qur’anic justification, believes that defensive
jihad can use both armed and unarmed means, as Nasrallah stated in a 1998 lecture “the
defensive jihad constitutes armed and unarmed struggle. An armed struggle means fighting the
enemy with blood and involves martyrdom. An unarmed struggle involves political, economic,
and cultural means. Our defensive jihad in Lebanon involves both forms.”20
Hezbollah began in 1982 as a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, though not
officially announcing their creation until 1985. From its inception, the organization was to be a
“resistance movement” against Israeli aggression and to a lesser degree a protector of Lebanon’s
Shi’a. Since 1982, Hezbollah has grown considerably and expanded their operations from purely
military to include become a political party, a source of information through the television
station, al-Manar, and through al-Nour radio, and a social service organization. Martin Rudner’s
Hizbollah: An Organizational and Operational Profile provides a heavily-sourced overview of
Hezbollah’s entire organization including funding sources, military operations, social programs,
and an organizational chart of the organization.21
In her article, Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political
Party, Krista E. Wiegand illustrates Hezbollah’s foundation as a political party after the
Lebanese Civil War ended in the early 1990s. Hezbollah agreed to enter into politics but did not

20

Hamzeh, 38.

21

Martin Rudner, “Hizbullah: An Organizational and Operational Profile,” International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, no. 2 (2010): 226-246. Also, James B. Love, Hezbollah: Social Services as
a Source of Power (Hurlburt Field: The JSOU Press, 2010) provides an overview of Hezbollah’s foundations,
modeling, and an analysis of its operational branches with particular focus on Hezbollah’s social services.
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disband or disarm like the other militias who entered into politics and elections. This has given
them an overall advantage in the political process. In May 2008, Hezbollah gunmen took control
of the capital for six days after nonviolent political protests did not manifest in Hezbollah’s
desires. Wiegand states that “The decision to use even some degree of political violence was a
major move by Hezbollah… The government has little choice about Hezbollah’s continued
armament. Hezbollah is stronger, more effective, and has more resolve than the Lebanese army,
and the government knows this.”22
In his 2002 article, A Clash of Wills: Hizbollah’s Psychological Campaign against Israel
in South Lebanon, Frederic M. Wehrey illustrates that Hezbollah’s success in forcing the 2000
Israeli withdrawal was from Hezbollah’s ability to mobilize the Shi’as using “Iranian
revolutionary doctrine, the propagation of a martyrdom ethos, and the provision of social
services.”23 In addition to discussions of mobilizing the Shi’a, Wehrey demonstrates
Hezbollah’s actions to enter into Lebanese politics and further illustrates Hezbollah’s actions to
force out Israel through psychological operations.
Natasha Lander in Hezbollah: Organizational Analysis of an Insurgency points to three
main areas that have helped Hezbollah continued existence and make it difficult for
counterinsurgency against Hezbollah. She claims that first and foremost, Hezbollah has been so
successful due to support from Iran and Syria. Second, due to Hezbollah’s political and social
programs the vastness of support from Shi’a, within Lebanon and across the world, has
empowered Hezbollah and the massive support is difficult to take away by the counterinsurgents.
Third, by providing public services in Lebanon, Hezbollah has engendered themselves with the
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local population that cannot be easily removed by counterinsurgents.24 These conclusions
illustrate the military and operational hurdles Israel would have to overcome in order to begin
successfully combating Hezbollah.
Frank G. Hoffman in Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars notes that
Hezbollah is actually a prototype for hybrid warfare, which will be discussed later in the next
section. Hoffman considers Hezbollah to be a prototype worthy of further study and, more
disturbingly, emulation by other organizations like HAMAS for how to fight against a militarily
superior state like Israel. Hoffman states:
The amorphous Hezbollah is representative of the rising hybrid threat… Mixing an
organized political movement with decentralized cells employing adaptive tactics in
ungoverned zones, Hezbollah showed that it could inflict as well as take punishment. Its
highly disciplined, well trained, distributed cells contested ground and wills against a
modern conventional force using an admixture of guerilla tactics and technology in
densely packed urban centers.25
Hezbollah’s military capability is more sophisticated and goes beyond simple armed resistance
or groups that try to bled an enemy like the Afghan Taliban, the Mujahedeen, or the Iraqi
insurgency.
Martin Rudner, in Hizbullah Terror Finance: Fund-Raising and Money-Laundering,
points to three main sources of revenue for the organization: military assistance from Syria and
Iran; tax-like levies on businesses in Hezbollah dominated areas; and revenue generated from
diaspora populations across the world.26 These sources of income are used to finance the various
parts of Hezbollah’s administrative apparatus. The Anti-Defamation League in Hezbollah’s
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International Reach cites Western intelligence reports that, as of 2004, Hezbollah needs between
$200 and $500 million to operate and only $100 million comes from Iran.27 This then requires
Hezbollah to make at least $100 million a year independently—a substantial amount for a nonstate actor to acquire. Logical reasoning concludes that Hezbollah has been successful in
bridging the gap in funds and has probably become more successful as Hezbollah’s operation can
only have increased in size and monetary need.
The literature demonstrates that Hezbollah makes use of diplomacy, information,
military, and economic power. These are the aspects of the DIME. This work seeks to add
understanding of insurgency and insurgent strategy by demonstrating that insurgencies and
insurgent groups can be viewed from and analyzed from frameworks typically reserved for
states.
1.2 Hybrid Warfare
In the aftermath of both globalization and the information age, a new theory of warfare
was generated—the theory of hybrid war. In essence, hybrid warfare is the utilization of both
conventional weapons and tactics and irregular weapons and tactics. The idea of hybrid warfare
is a relatively new academic topic. However, the practical use of hybrid warfare is not. Hybrid
warfare has been used in multiple conflicts throughout history. The British used regular troops
against Napoleon, while Spanish guerillas harassed the French forces and Washington’s regular
troops fought in battles, while Francis “The Swamp Fox” Marion’s irregular troops harassed
British forces during the American Revolution.
Hybrid warfare does not have a steadfast definition. Frank Hoffman defines hybrid
warfare as warfare that incorporates “a range of different modes of warfare including
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conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate
violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”28 The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
was asked to investigate if the DOD has defined hybrid warfare and how hybrid warfare differs
from other types of warfare and what is the extent to which the DOD is considered the
implications of hybrid warfare in its overarching strategic planning documents. The GAO
created the following diagram (Figure 1.3) to illustrate what actions could be used in hybrid
warfare

Figure 1.3: The Hybrid Warfare Concept29

In addition, the GAO report compiled various definitions including Frank Hoffman’s definition
of hybrid warfare (which had been omitted by the author):
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Hybrid Warfare—Conflict executed by either state and/or non-state threats that employs multiple
modes of warfare to include conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, and criminal disorder.
(U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center
for Operational Analysis briefing on “Joint
Adaptation to Hybrid War”)
Hybrid Threat—an adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs some fused
combination of (1) political, military, economic, social and information means and (2)
conventional, irregular, terrorism and disruptive/criminal conflict methods. It may include a
combination of state and non-state actors.
(Working definition derived by U.S. Joint
Forces Command, Joint Irregular Warfare
Center, 2008-2009)
Hybrid Threat—A threat that simultaneously employs regular and irregular forces, including
terrorist and criminal elements to achieve their objectives using an ever-changing variety of
conventional and unconventional tactics to create multiple dilemmas.
(U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command’s Operational Environment,
2009-2025)30
Lt. Col. Daniel T. Lasica in his monograph Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A
Theory of Victory defined hybrid war as “the merging of different methods and theories of war at
different levels of war, in different realms and domains, especially the cognitive and moral
domains, by a blend of actors, arranged in time and space to achieve objectives at all levels of
war.”31 Lasica, building in J.F.C. Fuller’s three domains framework for the study of war,
considers the cognitive domain to be where intellectual rigor is expended, ideas develop and
decisions made to defeat the enemy and the moral domain includes fear, courage, and the morale
of all parties involved in the conflict.32
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Col. John J. McCuen states that hybrid warfare is “although conventional in form, the
decisive battles in today’s hybrid wars are fought not on conventional battlegrounds, but on
asymmetric battlegrounds within the conflict zone population, the home front population, and the
international community population.”33 McCuen further states that in order to win hybrid wars,
we (the United States) “have to succeed on three decisive battlegrounds: (1) the conventional
battleground; (2) the conflict zone’s indigenous population battleground; (3) and the home front
and international community battleground.”34 In hybrid wars “the enemy strives to protract war
by conducting it within the population while simultaneously attempting to erode confidence at
home and abroad as a precursor to military victory.”35
1.3 Instruments of Power36
The instruments of power are used to exert strength and influence in order to elicit
responses that are beneficial to the goals of a nation. The Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02) defines instruments of national power as “all of the
means available to the government in pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as
diplomatic, economic, informational, and military.”37 The U.S. Army Special Operations Force
Unconventional Warfare (FM 3-05.130) notes that since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which
introduced the modern concept of nation-states, competition among nation-states has involved
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the instruments of state power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).38
These instruments were generally used during peacetime with the military taking a role for static
defense or for posturing.
The DIME is broken into two parts: soft power and hard power. Soft power is seen in the
diplomatic and informational aspects of the DIME, sources of power that have an affect but do
not destroy or cause casualties. Soft power does not have immediate consequences. As Joseph
Nye, Jr. says “soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.”39 The hard
power comes from the military and economic aspects. This is “the capacity to coerce including
both the threat of and resort to armed force, economic pressure including fiscal and commercial
sanctions, subversive techniques, and various forms of intimidation.”40
Diplomacy is the means in which one state officially relates to another. Diplomacy is
rarely used alone. It is more often used in conjunction with the other aspects of the DIME, Reed
J. Fendrick in Diplomacy as an Instrument of National Power comments “diplomacy never
functions in isolation from the other instruments of power but may at times be emphasized as the
situation warrants.”41 He also notes that diplomacy “fundamentally consists of a constant
assessment of other countries’ power potential, perceived vital interests, and relationship with
other states, in an attempt to maximize one’s own country’s freedom of action with the ultimate
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purpose of assuring the achievement of the nation’s vital interests, the core of which is
survival.”42
Diplomacy does not have to be solely used by states. Non-state actors use diplomacy as
well. Businesses meet to arrive at favorable conditions for coexistence and terrorist
organizations and insurgencies also use diplomacy to attain favorable conditions for the
establishment of bases of power. Osama bin Laden used diplomacy to arrive at a mutually
beneficial relationship with multiple counties including the Sudan and Afghanistan. Yasser
Arafat was able to get permission for the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to establish
bases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt. Arafat was even able to attain recognition for the PLO by
multiple non-Arab, non-Muslim states through speeches at the United Nations and diplomatic
meeting with leaders of states. Through diplomacy, insurgencies are able to attain levels of
legitimacy and can even use diplomacy as a means to apply pressure to the government or state
in which the group is competing.
Dennis M. Murphy in Strategic Communications: Wielding the Information Element of
Power cites Daniel T. Kuehl and Robert E. Nelson to define the information aspect of the DIME
as the “use of information content and technology as strategic instruments to shape fundamental
political, economic, military and cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the global behavior
of governments, supra-governmental organizations, and societies to support national security.”43
This aspect could also be described as propaganda. Murphy discusses propaganda and
specifically mentions that propaganda is the weapon of insurgencies. Murphy states,
“Propaganda is the weapon of the insurgent franchised cell. In a broad sense, terrorist
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organizations have learned the lessons of propaganda well.”44 The JP 1-02 defines propaganda
as “any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed
to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the
sponsor, either directly or indirectly.”45 As Murphy concludes, propaganda and information are
major aspects of insurgent movements.
Military power is, potentially, the most powerful aspect of the DIME. Through the use of
military force, nation-states and non-state actors can attempt to acquire their immediate
objectives. Realist theory of international relations states that in the anarchic global system, it is
the military that is the prime instrument of power. John F. Troxell in Military Power and the
Use of Force comments that “the other elements of power are certainly important and can
contribute to the furtherance of national interests; however, as long as states continue to exist in a
condition of anarchy, military power will continue to play a crucial role in international
politics.”46 Nation-states, however, are not the sole users of military force. Insurgencies are
based on armed conflict between a state and a group attempting to overthrow that state’s
government. However, correct usage of the military must be considered for both sides. For the
state fighting the insurgency, overuse of the military can lead to increased recruitment for the
insurgents through the deaths of civilians and can lead to tarnished public images. Both Israel
and the United States have continually had to deal with the use of military force and maintaining
a friendly public image. Insurgencies must carefully use military force if they hope to thrive. As
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will be discussed later, the 1916-1918 Arab Revolt targeted very specific targets in order to
prevent the needless loss of insurgent forces.
Economics is the last aspect of the DIME and an increasingly powerful aspect. Through
economic power, states can attain the same results as military force—the ability to deter, compel,
fight, and even rebuild a defeated opponent to the victor’s needs.47 Clayton K.S. Chun in
Economics: A Key Element of National Power states: “without the capacity to produce, finance,
or support key national security activities, a nation would have a limited ability to protect its
domestic and international interests.”48 He continues stating: “nations use economic tools to
pursue objectives, seek economic resources as national goals, or are affected by economic events
that influence their national security. Both state and non-state actors use economic power to
wage war and to influence events regionally or globally.”49 While states have the majority of
economic power, non-state actors have the ability to affect economies of their adversaries. The
introduction of counterfeit products weakens businesses, dealing illegal substances or drugs
undermine the authority of the government.
1.4 Irregular Warfare Theory50
T.E. Lawrence’s main thesis in the Science of Guerrilla Warfare states, “granted
mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to

47

Clayton K.S. Chun, “Economics: A Key Element of National Power,” in U.S. Army War College Guide to
National Security Issues Vol. 1: Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd. ed., 250.
48

Chun, 250.

49

Chun, 249.

50

This section of the literature review will not be exhaustive, there simply is too much written by multiple
authors including Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, Fidel Castro, Vo Nguyen Giap, Regis
Debray, and Carlos Marighella. The following authors were chosen due to their status as primary theorists and
practitioners and the impact of their writings on contemporary use and defense in irregular warfare. For an in-depth
history and analysis of revolutionary warfare see John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in Makers
of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), 815-862.

23

convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents ...”51 His thesis sets
the framework for successful insurgencies—mobility, security, and indoctrination. Mobility
allows for the insurgent force to hit where the enemy is weakest allowing for maximum damage
and minimal losses. Lawrence’s plan was to whittle down the Turkish army not through
casualties but through loss of materials, as Lawrence writes in Science of Guerilla Warfare:
In the Turkish Army materials were scarce and precious, men more plentiful than
equipment. Consequently the cue should be to destroy not the army but the materials.
The death of a Turkish bridge or rail, machine or gun, or high explosive was more
profitable than the death of a Turk.52
Regarding security of the insurgent forces, the Arabs fought a war of detachment. A war fought
completely through the element of surprise (i.e.—hit and runs, and the threat of attack—“to
contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing themselves till the
moment of attack”).53 This threat of attack was also not directed at enemy personnel, but against
their more precious materials, in particular, they would target parts of the railway far from any
Turkish protection almost eliminating the threat of combat and maximizing tactical success.
Another major aspect of the war of detachment was never providing a target to the opposing
forces, i.e. the Arabs would never get close enough to the Turks to provide a target “this chimed
with the numerical plea of never giving the enemy’s soldiers a target.” Successful application of
this concept can be seen in the success of Viet Cong fighters against American soldiers during
the Vietnam War as well as in the Afghanistan and the Iraqi insurgencies. By attacking when the
insurgent deemed it suitable, the American soldiers were put at the disadvantage inflicting
minimal damage to the insurgent, while suffering high levels of damage from the insurgent.
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Indoctrination provides an insurgency with mobility, security, and support.
Indoctrination is having parts of the population on the side of the insurgency. By having the
support of the population, insurgent forces can move about more quickly and easily (mobility)
and can exist within enemy held territory or have safe haven (security). Lawrence states: “the
printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury (sic) of the modern commander…”
However, the concept of spread information does not only apply to friendly populations, it also
should affect “the minds of the enemy, so far as it could reach them: and thirdly, the mind of the
nation supporting it behind the firing-line, and the mind of the hostile nation waiting the verdict,
and the neutrals looking on.” Lawrence explains further in his closing, “it must have a friendly
population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements
to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2% active striking force, and 98% passively
sympathetic.”54 As will be discuss with Mao Tse-Tung, the sympathies of the population are of
paramount importance to insurgencies. If enough of the population is unsympathetic, the
insurgency will fail.
Mao states that guerilla warfare is “a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military
equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation.” He notes that guerilla
warfare is by its nature inherently political and must maintain a political element: “without a
political goal, guerilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with
the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained.”
This political nature is what actually keeps the guerilla effort alive. Mao agrees with Lawrence
about the need for some kind of sympathy from the population “guerilla warfare basically

54

Lawrence, 5-9.

25

derives from the masses and is supported by them; it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates
itself from their sympathies and cooperation.”55 .
The sympathy and cooperation of the population provides new forces: “a primary feature
of guerilla operations is their dependence upon the people themselves to organize battalions and
other units” and these new battalions must “depend for their sustenance primarily upon what the
locality affords.”56 Mao laid out a three phase system to what he called revolutionary warfare, in
which guerilla warfare is an aspect. Phase I is small. It is “devoted to organization,
consolidation, and preservation of regional base areas situated in isolated and difficult terrain.”
This phase is marked by small, two-to-three man units receiving training, both military and
political, who then go out to secure the good will and sympathy of area populations. Phase II is
the slow expansion in both operations and the area of operations. The expansion in operations
includes an increase in attacks, sabotage, and the removal of dissidents. Through these actions
the emerging force is acquire supplies—ammunition, arms, medical supplies and radios. This
allows the guerillas to increase capability with minimal financial need. This phase also has an
increase in the political indoctrination of the areas that are targeted for absorption into the
guerilla territory.57 The third and final phase is the actual creation of a conventional military
force capable of fighting conventional battles resulting in either forcing a decision or destroying
the enemy.
French counterinsurgency expert and theorist, David Galula, in Counterinsurgency
Warfare: Theory and Practice, sets down the prerequisites for a successful insurgency. First and
foremost a cause is required “the first basic need for an insurgent who aims at more than simply
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making trouble is an attractive cause…with a cause, the insurgent has a formidable, if intangible,
asset that he can progressively transform into concrete strength.”58 He continues pointing out
that the cause has strategic criteria as well. The cause must be able to attract the most supporters
while alienating the least amount of the population, the more people alienated the greater the
number of potential enemies for the insurgency. Also, the insurgent must be able to wholly
identify with the cause or wholly identify with “the entire majority of the population theoretically
attracted to it.”59 Finally, the cause must be a lasting one. The life-span of a cause is the
difference between a strategic cause and a short-term tactical cause like food scarcity. In
discussion of the nature of the cause, Galula points out that the every country has problems so
there are always potential causes for the insurgent to take up be they political, social, economic,
racial, or even artificial causes. The artificial causes require propaganda which can make an
artificial cause into a perceived real cause.
In regards to the tactical aspects of a cause, Galula states “the insurgent has to appeal to
the whole, and a cause is necessary for that. Since it is easier to unite ‘against’ than ‘for’… the
general cause will most probably be a negative one…”60 Finally, the cause is malleable; the
insurgent can hold to the original cause or alter it according to the needs of the movement.
Hoffer also comments on the need of a cause and its malleability: “It is perhaps true that the
insight and shrewdness of the men who know how to set a mass movement in motion, or how to
keep one going, manifest themselves as much in knowing how to pick a worthy enemy as in
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knowing what doctrine to embrace and what program to adopt.”61 Kitson also agrees with
Galula about the importance of a cause:
the selection of a good cause often poses severe problems to the organizers of subversion
because the real reasons for the campaign may not be such as to attract the population at
all...Yet, if no cause exists it will have to be invented. If a genuine one exists but is not a
capable of attracting sufficient support, it must be amended until it does.62
In addition to the need of a cause, Galula provides an in-depth analysis of the situational
needs for a successful insurgency: the insurgency needs to be facing a regime with internal
problems.63 Galula gives five areas in which a regime can be strong or weak: (1) an absence of
problems; (2) a national consensus; resoluteness of the counterinsurgent leadership;
counterinsurgent leaders’ knowledge of counterinsurgency warfare; (3) the machine for the
control of the population, which is further broken down into the political structure, the
administrative bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces; and geographic conditions. These
are self-explanatory. If a regime has no problems, then there is ground for an insurgent cause. If
there is a national consensus on the regime or an expected way of life, the regime will be
stronger and more resistant to insurgencies than if there is no consensus on the regime.
Resoluteness of the counterinsurgent leadership and the leadership’s knowledge of
counterinsurgency warfare go hand-in-hand. If the leadership does not have the wherewithal to
fight a long fight against an insurgency, the insurgency will likely win. This is exacerbated if the
leadership has little or limited knowledge of how to actually combat the insurgency.
The means of control for the population differ. The first, the political structure, will
either nourish or strangle an insurgency. Galula uses Communist China as his example where
political opposition is not tolerated and the population lives until mutual distrust and suspicion

61

Hoffer, 95-96.

62

Kitson, 29.
See Galula, 17-22.

63

28

prevents any kind of insurgency from developing, in contrast, an open society allows for multiple
problems to be voiced and aired and the free gatherings of like-minded individuals that could
lead to an insurgency. In discussing the administrative bureaucracy, Galula uses the French
administrations of Algeria, a large state with the majority of the population not being of French
descent. The French divided and sub-divided the country into portions that required more people
than the French had, allowing the FLN to operate freely. The police being the main and first line
of defense during an insurgency require numerical strength, competent members, loyalty, and the
support of the other branches of the respective government, especially the judicial branch, “If
insurgents, though identified and arrested by the police, take advantage of the many normal
safeguards built into the judicial system and are released, the police can do little.”64
The armed forces are broken down into four sections. Essentially, the military needs
numerical superiority in relation to the size and population of the country; a preferred ration is
ten or twenty counterinsurgents for every one insurgent. The armed forces actually need to be
less sophisticated compared to the insurgent. The insurgent will not fight fancy, the
counterinsurgent should not either. The armed forces need soldiers who are loyal to the regime
and not the insurgency. Galula points out that due to personnel demands, some counterinsurgent
forces are forced to institute a draft. A draft while increasing numbers could plague the
counterinsurgent with forces that are not loyal to the regime but to the insurgents.
Finally, the counterinsurgent forces should not be delayed in being deployed. The goal of
revolutionary insurgent warfare is a gradual increase in hostilities. Galula argues that the
counterinsurgent should not wait until war breaks out to deploy forces. However, that is the
purview of the politicians, not the military. Galula’s final regime weakness and a separate
section is that of the border stating that “the border areas are a permanent source of weakness for
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the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and this advantage is usually
exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. The final
prerequisite is outside support. Outside support can come in many forms—moral support,
political support, technical support, financial support, and military support.65
1.5 Research Design/Strategy
The research question for this project is “to what extent has Hezbollah successfully
waged irregular warfare against Israel?” For the purpose of this study, success will be viewed as
the ability for Hezbollah to accomplish its goals against Israel as first seen in the 1985 Open
Letter and in subsequent official Hezbollah documents:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the expulsion of Israel from Lebanese territory,
the guarding and preservation of Lebanon from Israeli aggression,
the liberation of Jerusalem, and
the total destruction of the state of Israel, known to Hezbollah as the “Zionist entity”

This study will focus on the first two objectives of Hezbollah: the expulsion of Israeli forces
from Lebanon and guarding Lebanon from Israeli aggression. These are the most realistic
objectives of Hezbollah and these objectives have actually been accomplished, first on May 24,
2000 when Israeli forces withdrew from Lebanon and second, the 2006 34-Day War in which
Hezbollah successfully fended off Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon. The liberation of
Jerusalem and the destruction of Israel are more tools to keep the movement relevant and popular
among the population. The likelihood of a “liberation” of Jerusalem and the complete removal
of the state of Israel is very slim of occurring without a major regional power shift or conflict.
Primary data sources utilized are oral histories and testimonies. Many of these sources
are from Israel and releases from Hezbollah. U.N. and NGO reports are also used. U.S.
Congressional testimonies are used as a source for both governmental awareness and as a source
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for opinions from subject experts. Secondary sources come from the multitude of academic,
published work available on Hezbollah and the different aspects of the DIME. In addition to
academic works, various magazines and newspapers have been utilized.
As Hezbollah’s success in irregular warfare is a complex topic, the research design and
strategy of this work attempts to simplify the data gathering and analysis. A table of indicators
has been created that are related to each aspect of the DIME. From these indicators, this study
will qualitatively analyze the extent and success of Hezbollah in each aspect.

Diplomacy
I1: International
pressure on Israel
I2: Status as non-state
actor
I3: Lack of pressure
on Hezbollah from
other states

Table 1.1 Indicators of Success
Information
Military
I4: al-Manar
I7: Military armament
I5: Large recruitment
pool

I8: Tactics and
operations

I6: Providing social
services

I9: Safe Haven

Economics
I10: income sources
(legal/illegal)
I11: State-sponsorship

I12: Diaspora
donations

Diplomacy
This section will analyze Hezbollah’s use of diplomacy to alter the perception and
support of other states to help Hezbollah in achieving its goals. Official diplomatic channels are
likely not to be used by the organization. Instead, Hezbollah will most likely use violent “gunbarrel” diplomacy rather than peaceful dialogue-based diplomacy.
I1: International pressure on Israel: This indicator will look at and analyze what
Hezbollah has done to increase international pressure on Israel to either concede Israeli goals,
halt military actions, etc…
I2: Status as a non-state actor: Hezbollah’s status as a non-state actor allows them to exist
in a grey area within international law regimes. This indicator will look to evidence that
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Hezbollah makes a conscience effort to portray themselves, internationally, as an entity that does
not bow to international pressure because that pressure does not apply to Hezbollah due to their
status as a non-state actor.
I3: Lack of pressure on Hezbollah from other states: The international community has not
come to a unified agreement about whether Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. Many states
only condemn and consider the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, but not the
rest of the organization. This translates into a significant amount of leeway for Hezbollah’s
operations and the inability for the organization to be pressured internationally.
Information
This aspect of the DIME will look at Hezbollah’s use of information dissemination and
other recruiting tools. The strength of irregular warfare and subversion comes from the ability to
recruit, mobilize, and, most importantly, keep the loyalty of the masses of people; therefore, the
strength of an organization’s information dispersion is key to success.
I4: al-Manar: This indicator will analyze Hezbollah’s use of their TV station al-Manar.
This indicator will look at the various programs that are presented on al-Manar and analyze
which programs and how much time is devoted to certain topics.
I5: Large recruitment pool: Through the use of information dissemination through
Hezbollah controlled sources, Hezbollah has been able to maintain a large recruitment pool that
grows with every success Hezbollah can create, either naturally or artificially.
I6: Providing social services: This indicator will look at the various social services
provided by Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s ability to provide social services engenders the organization
with the population that benefits from their services in turn this produces a population that
approves and aides Hezbollah in various ways.
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Military
This aspect of the DIME will look at the military capabilities of Hezbollah. While
irregular warfare has a major political aspect, it also has a major military component that must be
able to work in concert with the political goals of a movement.
I7: Military armament: This indicator will elaborate on Hezbollah’s military armament.
It will look at the types of armament Hezbollah has acquired and its damage potential.
I8: Tactics and operations: Hezbollah has advanced since their inception in the early
1980s. Their advancement has not only been manifested in the changing of domestic tactics, but
also in their military tactics. This indicator will look at Hezbollah’s early tactics compared with
tactics used during the 2006 33-Day War.
I9: Safe Haven: The ability for Hezbollah to operate within safe havens is an important
military aspect. Since Hezbollah operates within Lebanon and in other countries, Hezbollah has
safety from military strikes and kinetic-based efforts to harm the organization.
Economic
The final aspect of the DIME, economics, will look at Hezbollah’s financial activities and
sources. Movements cannot survive without funding and support from somewhere, whether the
native population or from a state. This aspect will analyze where Hezbollah finds its financial
support.
I10: Income sources (legal/illegal): As any organization needs financial backing,
Hezbollah has turned to both legal and illegal means to acquire financial security. This indicator
will look at the various sources of Hezbollah’s income both legal and illegal.
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I11: State-sponsorship: Hezbollah was founded with the help of Iran and today functions
with support from both Iran and Syria. This indicator will look at the degree of funding
Hezbollah receives from Iran and Syria.
I12: Diaspora donations: Hezbollah is a Shiite organization and claims to represent the
Shi’a of Lebanon. These populations support Hezbollah financially by either making donations
to the organization or to the various businesses and charities that Hezbollah runs.
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Section 2: Diplomacy
This section will analyze the diplomatic indicators of success: (1) international pressure
on Israel; (2) Hezbollah’s status as a non-state actor; and (3) lack of unified international
pressure on Hezbollah.
2.1 Indicator 1: International pressure on Israel
From the evidence, Hezbollah does not have an actual diplomatic mission specifically
designed to increase international pressure against Israel; however, Hezbollah seems to be able to
provoke Israel into actions that result in Israel damaging its reputation in the international
community. Through Hezbollah’s provocation of Israel and Israel’s military and political
blunders, Hezbollah has indirectly been able to increase international pressure on Israel. This
pressure on comes from the same sources it has always come—the forces opposed to Israel, i.e.
Hezbollah, the Lebanese government, the United Nations (Israel was in violation of UNSCR
435) and UNIFIL, and various human rights organization particularly Human Rights Watch, who
released publications about 1993’s Operation Accountability and 1996’s Operation Grapes of
Wrath. These were punitive operations meant to punish the Lebanese government and
population of Lebanon for supporting Hezbollah. However, much like what will be discussed in
Indicator 3, Israel had the near unwavering support of the United States, which at the time was at
the height of its international power as the sole remaining superpower.
Operation Grapes of Wrath came to a halt after the Fijian UNIFIL detachment’s base at
Qana was mortared resulting in the deaths of over one hundred civilian refugees. Israel claimed
they had no knowledge that it was a UNIFIL compound and that Hezbollah fighters launched
rockets from a cemetery nearby then fled into the compound for safety. However, in Warriors of
God, Nicholas Blanford claims that the findings of the UN investigation into the Qana Massacre
showed that for Israel to know where the Hezbollah fighters were and where they fled, would
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have seen the big, black UN painted on the side of a white wall. Blanford claims that Secretary
of State Madeline Albright exercised undue influence resulting in the findings not leading to
major international repercussions.66 Thus, much like Hezbollah, because Israel had the backing
of a powerful state, the consequences of international pressure were mitigated. The real pressure
came from the Israeli civilian population, as will be discussed later.
Hezbollah did not have to act or lobby states or the United Nations for increased
international pressure on Israel. Hezbollah allowed Israel to increase the international pressure
on themselves. Israel’s political situation would have already generated international pressure on
Israel. Violations of UNSCR 435 and the situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
compounded by the occupation of Lebanese territory and Israel’s reactions to Hezbollah attacks
embodied in Operations Accountability and Grapes of Wrath, did not aid Israel’s political
situation. However, international political pressure on Israel was and has been negated due to
the United States’ unwavering financial, political, and military support provided to Israel. No
matter what Hezbollah did to get a reaction from Israel, any international political repercussions
from Israel’s actions were negated by U.S. support.
2.2 Indicator 2: Hezbollah’s status as a non-state actor
Hezbollah’s status as a non-state actor is a point of extensive debate. On the one hand,
Hezbollah is not a state; therefore, by definition it is a non-state actor. On the other hand,
Hezbollah is an official political party that is part of the Lebanese government. This aspect will
be discussed below. If Hezbollah is considered a non-state actor, then Hezbollah falls into gray
area in international law. Depending on how Hezbollah is officially designated alters what jus in
bello Hezbollah is covered.67 While military uniforms are worn, no consistent evidence has been
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found describing details of what their uniforms contain or if they display insignia. In fact,
Catherine Bloom in The Classification of Hezbollah in Both International and Non-International
Armed Conflicts discusses the veracity of labeling Hezbollah a non-state actor in the aftermath of
the 2006 War. The labeling of Hezbollah as either a state actor or a non-state actor affects how
the Geneva Convention laws would apply. If Hezbollah is considered a state actor, then as
acting on behalf of Lebanon, Hezbollah would have to adhere to and be regulated by Article
Four of the Geneva Convention on the classification and treatment of prisoners of war.
However, even if considered a non-state actor, they have been part of two cease-fire
negotiations, at the end of 1993s Operation Accountability and 1996s Operation Grapes of
Wrath. These state-based negotiations place them on the same level with nation-states. They
describe themselves as a “resistance movement” against Israeli aggression and as a political
party. The Ta’if Agreement included a section on the removal of Israeli forces from Lebanese
territory. In labeling themselves a “resistance movement” against Israel, Hezbollah was able to
not be forced to disarm.68
Hezbollah’s ability to escape the label as a state actor until the 2006 Summer War
provided considerable leeway in their operations. As a non-state actor, Hezbollah escapes the
ramifications and punishments reserved for states conducting aggressive actions. However,
while Hezbollah is considered a non-state actor, it has been a valid party in the conflict with
Israel being a part of two cease-fire negotiations and an absence of United Nations actions
against the organization outside of criminal activity.
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2.3 Indicator 3: Lack of unified international pressure on Hezbollah
International pressure on Hezbollah is not unified or comprehensive, if pressure on
Hezbollah actually exists. From the evidence, it seems that in order to pressure Hezbollah, the
United States and Israel would have to rely on putting pressure on Iran, Syria, and Lebanon.
Hezbollah is only designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, Israel, Bahrain,
Egypt, Canada, and the Netherlands. The military wing—the Islamic Resistance and the
External Security Apparatus, are designated as terrorist by the United Kingdom and Australia.
The majority of the Arab world considers Hezbollah to be a legitimate resistance organization
against Israel. Additionally, states like Venezuela and Brazil, who have relations with Iran and
lean toward counterbalancing United States interests, either provide Hezbollah operational
theaters or turn a blind eye toward Hezbollah’s activities as seen with the two Argentinean
bombings and Hezbollah’s activities in the Tri-Border area where the Brazilian, Paraguayan, and
Argentinean borders meet.
Much like United Nations sanctions, as long as one state does not participate or shows
token acknowledgment, pressuring Hezbollah will not work. As Hezbollah is sponsored by
Syria and Iran, two major states in close proximity to Lebanon, their support for Hezbollah will
only halt if and when the incentives for each country to halt sponsorship are met, if these
incentives exist. Additionally, international support or international apathy for Hezbollah
follows the coattails of Iranian diplomacy. For instance, Iranian-Venezuelan relations have
opened up Venezuelan territory for Hezbollah’s use on Margarita Island.
Margarita Island is reportedly utilized by the Nassereddine Network, a network
established by Venezuela’s Ghazi Nassereddine, a native-born Lebanese who naturalized in
Venezuela, is now Venezuela’s second-ranking diplomat in Syria. His brother Abdullah, a
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former member of the Venezuelan legislature, uses his position as the former vice president of
the Federation of Arab and American Entities in Latin America and the president of its local
section in Venezuela, has established money-laundering operations and is reported to be in
charge of Hezbollah’s business dealings in Latin America. Ghazi’s other brother, Oday, has
established paramilitary training camps on the island and then sends recruits to Iran for further
training.69 Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has also aided in securing a relationship between
Iran and Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador.70
Legally, there have been two different internationally created cease-fires—one in 1993
and one in 1996—that have acknowledged the right for Lebanon to resist the Israeli occupation
as long as civilians are not specifically targeted by both sides.71 This exact military nature of this
will be discussed in the military section. However, the lack of international pressure on
Hezbollah is evident in the fact that rules were established for the conduct of military actions by
both sides.
Assessment
The lack of international pressure on Hezbollah may be the most important of the
diplomatic indicators. Hezbollah has benefitted from the international political situation in
which states do or do not have a vested interest in the situation in the Middle East. States with
interests in the Middle East will get involved on the side of their primary concerns, thus states
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will come in on one side or the other. If a state is more supportive of Israel, the state will be
more active in altering the situation to benefit Israel. If a state is against Israel, it will be more
active in benefitting the forces against Israel. This lack of pressure leads to a lack of prohibitions
and enforcement of those prohibitions against Hezbollah. The increase in countries with a
friendly or neutral attitude to Hezbollah increase the potential for Hezbollah to find safe haven or
areas to conduct operations, either military or financial, far away from the threat of either Israeli
or U.S. intervention. Placing state apathy aside, the only actions that can be conducted against
Hezbollah are against their blatantly criminal activities, which will be discussed in Section 5.
Additionally, much like the situation with Israel, Hezbollah benefits from the state support of
both Syria and Iran. Thus, Hezbollah can find succor and support even if intense international
pressure was placed upon the group. Imagine if al-Qaeda had received consistent support from
states with large economies much like Hezbollah receives, not just a safe haven in Afghanistan.
The dismantling of al-Qaeda would have been much more time consuming and had fewer results.
This is the case with Hezbollah, for any international pressure to be significant; the organization
would have to have all states unified against the group.
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Section 3: Information
Hezbollah’s information operations are truly dedicated to “hearts and minds” operations
that are key to the life and survivability of insurgencies. There appear to be two objectives of
Hezbollah’s information instrument—(1) conduct psychological warfare against the state of
Israel, the Israeli Defense Force, and the people of Israel and (2) to promote and sustain a
“resistance culture.” In Hezbollah’s 13 Principles of War, principles 11 and 12 dictate “the
media has innumerable guns, whose hits are like bullets. Use them in the battle!” and “the
population is a treasure - nurture it!”72 Hezbollah was so successful in their use of information
that Hezbollah’s mode of fighting was labeled “guerilla warfare psychologically waged.”73
In Hezbollah’s ideology, “resistance” is the fighting of the “oppressed” or “occupied”
against the “oppressor” or “occupier.”74 This dichotomy is not limited to Arabs or Muslims but
includes all peoples in the world who are socially, economically, politically, or culturally
oppressed.75 While the oppressed/oppressor dichotomy seems like a universally rallying call for
revolution for Hezbollah, oppressor/oppressed is really based off of a group’s opinion of Zionism
(Israel) and the United States—if you are in favor of U.S. policies or Israel, you are one of the
oppressors or a tool of the oppressors; if you reject U.S. policies and Israel, you are welcomed
into the fold of the oppressed.76
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This section will analyze the informational indicators of success: propaganda, a large
recruitment pool, and provision of social services. The idea behind these indicators is that of
equal if not greater importance to guerilla movements is acquiring and maintaining the loyalty of
the indigenous population. As a result, the propaganda indicator will look at Hezbollah’s
information outlets and how these outlets are used to spread Hezbollah’s message. In addition,
Hezbollah’s use of information warfare will be analyzed. The large recruitment pool indicator
will look at how Hezbollah uses its information outlets to add to and maintain a viable
recruitment pool. The provision of social services indicator will look at what kind of social
services Hezbollah provides and how these services are used to spread the message of Hezbollah.
3.1 Indicator 4: Propaganda
It is very silly and ironic for anyone to think that because our fight is based on religion
and ideology that we will attack an Israeli tank with a sword and a shield. We have to
use the most advanced means, whether in war or in peace and it is well known that the
most advanced weapon is psychological warfare and we use the media as part of this
warfare. We use real pictures; we don’t act out the campaign or the victories. We show
you scenes of Israelis weeping and screaming like children. Scenes of our fighters taking
the most difficult of the enemy’s military bases, scenes of martyrdom operations, we show
you the last testimonial of the brother ready to leave this world. We film all these
realities and offer them to the nation.77
Hezbollah expertly used information warfare against Israel. Hezbollah was adroitly able to
consistently control the message and the spin of almost all actions taken against Israel in the
security zone in southern Lebanon. In their control of the message against Israel, they were able
to both provide information to the population and discredit the official information released by
the IDF and Israeli government. As Timur Goksul, former spokesman and advisor to UNIFIL
(United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) stated, “Hizballah knows they’re not going to win the
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war on the battlefield, so they’re not taking on Israel’s military might on the ground. They’re
taking the Israelis on psychologically.”78
The key to Hezbollah’s information and psychological warfare was their use of
“propaganda of the deed.” Propaganda of the deed (POTD) is defined as “a term depicting an act
of violence whose signal and/or extreme nature is intended to create an ideological impact
disproportionate to the act itself.”79 POTD provided Hezbollah with instances in time, through
military action, that provided greater impact than the commission and direct result of the deed.
As on Hezbollah official said: “On the field, we hit one Israeli soldier…but a tape of him crying
for help affects thousands of Israelis…we realized the impact of our amateur work on the morale
of the Israelis.”80 The image and impact of one Israeli soldier being shot being shown on the
news had a greater impact on the civilian image of the occupation, than if that soldier had been
simply reported as wounded in a summary.
Hezbollah established a War Information Unit. The War Information Unit’s role was to
“be responsible, moreover, for waging a war of information against Israel and for recording the
testaments of all combatants and future martyrs before their departure for the front.”81 Through
the establishment and use of the War Information Unit, all operations were recorded and after the
operation, the recording was sent to Beirut to be edited and then aired on Hezbollah’s television
station, al-Manar. Additionally, by having their own reporters involved in operations, Hezbollah
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was able to attain video and footage that could be used to their advantage and Israel could not
deny or discredit the film. The only copies were controlled by Hezbollah. As a result, whatever
Hezbollah produced, Israel and the IDF were hard-pressed in any attempt to discredit it, for
example:
in one instance, following IDF accusations that Hizballah had killed an innocent civilian
instead of a top SLA security man, Hizballah released videotape showing the man leaving
his house dressed in combat gear, carrying any automatic rifle, and escorted by
bodyguards. He is shown getting into a van that Hizballah later destroys with a roadside
bomb.82
The one-sided nature of Hezbollah’s combat footage also allowed Hezbollah to show
snippets of the actual action. In 1994, Hezbollah was able to infiltrate the Israeli military
compound of Dla’at. During this infiltration, Hezbollah was able to successfully raise their flag
on the flag post. This action was then used to symbolize Hezbollah’s success against Israel and
that the Resistance would, in the end, prevail against the superior IDF. What is not included in
the use of this action is that unit was eventually driven out of Dla’at, thus making the notion of
Hezbollah’s taking of the compound moot.83 However, symbolically, this is a major instance of
Hezbollah being able to provide exclusive footage from actual operations that would be
broadcast repeatedly to the pleasure of supporters of the Resistance and to the displeasure of
Israeli officials attempting to sustain public support for the occupation.
In addition to the providing combat footage, Hezbollah in 2000 aired it’s ‘Who is Next?’
campaign. (Figure 3.1) This campaign was directly aimed at undermining military morale and
the morale of the families of members of the IDF. ‘Who is Next?’ showed photos of the latest
Israeli casualties, most likely provided by embedded report from the War Information
Department, and then in Hebrew, present a picture of a silhouette asking ‘Who is Next?’
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Figure 3.1: Who's Next?84

The spreading of and maintenance of a message is of the utmost importance for a
guerrilla movement. If the group lacks a message, it no longer has a purpose for the general
population to become attached to and then which to identify. Hezbollah’s message and
propaganda machine is best represented by Hezbollah’s television station, al-Manar. Al-Manar
is crucial for the maintenance of Hezbollah’s public relations campaign both domestically and
internationally. Not only does this propaganda boost Hezbollah’s appeal to both local and
international populations, it aides in spreading the message of the evils of both Israel and the
United States. After the 2000 withdrawal, bumper stickers were distributed saying, “Without al84
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Manar, victory would have been elusive.”85 The substance of al-Manar is not agreed upon. Ron
Schleifer in Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus
Israel, illustrates al-Manar as Hezbollah’s PSYOP campaign,86 Avi Jorisch in Beacon of Hatred:
Inside Hizballah’s al-Manar Television, states al-Manar’s goal is to spread propaganda,87 and
Dr. Anne Marie Baylouny in Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and
Ideologies, explains that programs, other than news, are quite neutral and are more akin to
programs on PBS.88
Hezbollah became masters of the use of propaganda against Israel. Schleifer in
describing Hezbollah’s psychological operations against Israel points to Hezbollah as having
three audiences in attacking Israel—the home audience, originally the Shi’a of southern Lebanon
and would eventually include the Sunni and Christians, the enemy audience, both the Israeli
civilian population and IDF, and neutrals, which included states, organizations, and individuals,
essentially all those not directly involved in the conflict.89
Hezbollah’s use of propaganda against Israel was extremely crucial for their success and
is likely the most powerful Information indicator. In controlling the information sphere and how
that information was displayed and projected, Hezbollah was able to use information to
demoralize the Israeli population while emboldening the Arab population. Information is crucial
for guerilla movements and insurgencies. If the movements can control the flow and perception
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of information, then the adversaries must fight an uphill struggle to not only discredit the
available information but also spin the information in a manner conducive to their goals while
consistently managing criticism of the information produced. This is where Israel was
substantially weak versus Hezbollah. Israel was militarily superior; although Hezbollah was able
to control the flow of information negating Israel’s superiority.
3.2 Indicator 5: Maintenance of a large recruitment pool
Through the spread of information, Hezbollah has been able to maintain a large pool of
potential recruits. These recruits are not all necessarily Shi’a but come from all groups within
Lebanon. In 1991, Hezbollah launched a major domestic political campaign. This campaign’s
goal was to introduce a Hezbollah that, instead of being a fanatical, unbending, militant group
aiming to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon, would be a willing participant in Lebanon postTa’if Agreement.90 This process would be known as Infitah, Arabic for “opening up,” or the
more commonly known Lebanonization. In short, Infitah was Hezbollah’s shedding of their
much-feared civil war image of suicide-bombing and kidnapping fanatics into a nationalistoriented political party that had an extensive military apparatus.
The goal of Infitah was to create dialogue amongst the different confessional groups in
order to “rid Lebanon of its political and social problems, foster national unity, and build a
stronger-united Lebanon on the common grounds of respecting human values.”91 Hezbollah
dropped much of their Islamic state rhetoric found in the 1985 Open Letter and instead portrayed
themselves as an Islamic political party that, while believing Islam to be the ultimate form of
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government, adheres to the much cited “no compulsion in religion” tenet of Islam. Instead, they
would adhere and model Islam and when the entire population of Lebanon, both Muslim and
Christian, were ready for an Islamic state, then Hezbollah’s dream of an Islamic Lebanon would
be fulfilled—
We don’t seek the application of Islam by force or violence but by peaceful political
action, which gives the opportunity for the majority in any society to adopt or reject it. If
Islam becomes the choice of the majority then we will apply it, if not, we will continue to
coexist and discuss till we reach correct beliefs. We hereby affirm that our Islam rejects
violence as a method to gain power, and this should be the formula for the non-Islamists
as well.92
During this time is when Hezbollah gained political capital through their provision of
social services.
Another major aspect of Lebanonization was Hezbollah’s declaration to strive for the
abolition of Lebanon’s confessional system described in their 1992 Electoral Program as they
key reason for Lebanon’s misfortunes. In 1996, as “the center of the essential flaw in the
formula of the Lebanese political system and social structure … the most dangerous thing that
confronts the state and topples its logic is politicizing the administration and linking it to political
loyalties away from the criteria of qualification and equality.”93 Historically, political power in
Lebanon was divided between the Maronite Christian, Greek Orthodox, Sunnis, Shi’a, and the
Druze.94 Positions of power were allotted based on religion for example, the Presidency would
be Maronite, the Prime Minister would be Sunni, and the President of the National Assembly
would be Shi’a and a constant 6:5 ratio between Christian and Muslim members of parliament.
Eventually, the Shi’a would come to be the majority sect within Lebanon but did not have a
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proportional increase in political power. This sectarian system was blamed for the outbreak of
the civil war in 1975.
As a major step to implementing Infitah, Hezbollah made peace with the Christian sects
within Lebanon. The most significant event was Hezbollah’s meeting with the Maronite
Patriarch. In the 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah’s original manifesto, there is extensive
condemnation of the leaders and the acts committed by the Phalangists, the Lebanese Front, and
the Lebanese Forces. These are all varying names for political Maronism. The Kataeb party,
also known as Lebanese Phalanges, was established in 1936 and played a major role in securing
Lebanon’s independence from the French mandate in 1943. Ideologically, the party saw
Lebanon as a refuge “for the oppressed minorities of the Arab East and struggled for preserving
Lebanon as a liberal outlet where Eastern Christianity can socially, politically, and economically
flourish in peace with its surroundings.”95 As a result, the Phalanges were seen as the founders
and sustainers of the confessional system that greatly favored the Maronite Christians over the
Muslim populations. In addition to being the founders of Lebanon’s confessional system, there
also existed an underlying philosophy of what Lebanon should be:
(1) The exclusive Maronite identity of Lebanon has been established for thousands of
years.
(2) Xenophobic nationalism: ‘We are the Christian Lebanese nation, and the others do not
belong.’ Since Lebanon is the nation-state of the Maronites, the Muslims are considered
foreigners and should be deported.
(3) Maronite Christian supremacy: The Lebanese populace is Maronite and the word
“Maronite” means Lebanese. Thus, the Lebanese are Maronites, and Lebanon and the
Maronites is one and the same thing.
(4) The Maronite history does not mention Islam as such, rather it refers to the “Arab
conquest” stressing the need to liberate Lebanon from Muslim presence and transform it
into a Maronite nation-state. Since the Arabic language is the language of the Muslim
conquerors, the Maronites have called for its abolishment and its replacement with Latin
script.
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(5) The coalescence among the Maronites, “crusaders”, and “Zionists” as a means of
empowerment by reliance on the West and its tutelage.96
Though Hezbollah included a specific section in their Open Letter titled “Words to the
Christians in Lebanon,” in which the organization explains that as long as Christians respect
Muslims and vice versa there is no reason for not having a peaceful coexistence and Hezbollah
does not aim to compel Christians to convert to Islam, it would not be considered irrational that
after 32 years of political dominance and 15 years of civil war, anyone associated with Maronism
would be skeptical about a peaceful coexistence with the only group that was allowed to keep
their weapons. This is why Hezbollah meeting with the Maronite Patriarch was such a major
step in reconciliation between the two groups. The Patriarch would eventually state that the
Islamic Resistance has the right to liberate occupied Lebanese areas and he had great confidence
in the Islamic Resistance and how the Resistance planned to secure the liberation.97
Furthermore, Hezbollah succeeded in securing the military support from all the
confessions. On November 3, 1997, special combat units were created that were open to all
Lebanese men, regardless of their religious affiliation. These units were labeled the Multiconfessional Lebanese Brigades or The Lebanese Brigade for Resisting Occupation. As
Hezbollah’s Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem explains: “the Party took an extraordinary
step in accommodation of those young individuals who aspired to resisting occupation but who
were not firm believers in the Party’s ideological and cultural background, despite their belief in
Hizbullah’s qualifications to lead resistance activity.” 98 An even bigger change was that the
families of these fighters would be provided for should they be killed—a house, education,
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medical care, and a stipend of $350 or more. The same benefits received by regular, Shi’a
members of the Islamic Resistance.
Infitah or Lebanonization was a crucial part of Hezbollah’s greater political and
informational operations in the aftermath of the civil war. In redefining themselves as a national
movement, not just a Shi’a movement, and focusing on using information to build ties with the
other confessional groups across Lebanon. In radically changing their public perception,
Hezbollah opened themselves to the benefits of not only having general public support, but
having the potential for a large recruitment pool. A large recruitment pool provides Hezbollah
with legions of potential recruits or sources of support. Additionally, the large recruitment pool
is not exclusively from the Lebanese Shi’a but from Christians and other confessions. This then
provides a broader range of physical support and financial support from the other confessions.
3.3 Indicator 6: Provision of social services
As an active way of spreading the benefits and cause of Hezbollah, the group extensively
provides social services to the population of south Lebanon. SWET (sewage, water, electricity,
trash) were the main services originally provided by Hezbollah. In reference to waste disposal,
Hezbollah, between 1988 and 1991, removed 65 tons a day from the southern Beirut suburbs - an
area with a population of half a million. Water was provided, free of charge, for families within
southern Beirut. Overall, the main focus of Hezbollah’s social services were to provide “…
vocational training, providing villages with water, electricity, and sewage utilities, working
towards the creation of health centres and infirmaries, construction and restoration of educational
institutions, cultural clubs, mosques and homes for needy families or martyrs’ relations.”99 As
the organization grew, it provided hospitals, schools, scholarships, construction, and financial
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support for the families of fallen fighters. By providing these services, which the state cannot,
Hezbollah engenders itself among the population. Therefore, not only does Hezbollah represent
an armed struggle for Lebanon’s physical security, it also represents a diligent provider for the
well-being of all peoples seeking succor. Shawn Teresa Flanigan sums up Hezbollah’s benefits
of providing social services:
Given the high reliance on nonprofit service providers in the developing world, as well as
the frequency of service provision by a single organization, insurgent organizations
providing health and social services can have substantial influence on those receiving
services. When a service recipient is dependent on one particular organization for aid, the
recipient lacks the power and liberty to accept or decline services or question a service
provider’s demands.100
There are three main units and multiple sub-units in Hezbollah’s service organization. The main
units are the Social Unit, the Islamic Health Unit, and the Education Unit.
The Social Unit is comprised of four sub-units: Jihad al-Binaa Association founded in
1988 provides construction services and access to utilities to populations located in south
Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and south Beirut. For example, in the aftermath of Grapes of Wrath
in 1996, Hezbollah was able, in two months, to rebuild 5,000 homes in 82 villages, repaired
roads and infrastructure, and paid compensation to 2,300 farmers.101 The Martyr’s Foundation
founded in 1982, provides for the families of martyrs, detainees, resistance fighters, and
civilians. The Martyr’s Foundation provides housing, work opportunities, youth employment,
and support for widows. The Foundation for the Wounded founded in 1990, gives support to
those injured or disabled as the result of Israeli attack. Support comes in the form of monthly
payments, housing services, education, counseling, support groups, and runs two rehabilitation
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centers. The final sub-unit of the Social Unit is the Khomeini Support Committee created in
1982 after the Israeli invasion. The Khomeini Support Committee provides monthly payments,
food coupons and rations, household necessities, clothes, health care, and education to the poor
and needy families that were directly affected by the occupation or Israeli attack.102
The Islamic Health Unit does not have sub-units like the Social Unit. It provides various
health care services. These services include hospitals, dispensaries, mobile dispensaries, dental
clinics, and civil defense centers. As of the year 2000, over 400,000 people receive services
from the Islamic Health Unit. The Education Unit also does not include sub-units. The
Education Unit provides scholarships and financial aid to students. From 1996-2001, Hezbollah
spent $14,215,000 on these financial aid and scholarship packages, between 2000-2001,
$3,569,408 was spent and 23,000 students were sent to school as a result of that money.103
Besides scholarships and financial aid, the Education Unit also runs various schools including
primary and secondary schools, at lower cost than other private schools, as well as technical
universities and religious institutes.104 As a result of the Social Unit, Hezbollah provides the
necessities of life, engendering them to Hezbollah, which translates into loyalty to Hezbollah.
This loyalty comes in multiple forms including a large pool of recruits into the Islamic
Resistance, political loyalty giving Hezbollah more power within the Lebanese government, or
financial support.
Hezbollah provision of social services is a major aspect in Hezbollah’s spread of
information. In providing both their native population and any one from any group a range of
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services, Hezbollah has replaced the state as the main provider of services. As a replacement for
the state, Hezbollah then becomes the recipient of populations’ loyalty, not the state. As a result,
Hezbollah is thanked for keeping families alive or providing educations to family members of
fallen fighters—a service most states could not provide.
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Section 4: Military
While Hezbollah is an official Lebanese political party, with seats in the Lebanese
Parliament and major part of the opposition bloc, Hezbollah has and maintains a military wing,
the Islamic Resistance (al-muqawama al-islamiya). The Islamic Resistance is responsible for all
military actions conducted by Hezbollah—raids, bombings, rocket attacks, etc. As a mode of
war, irregular warfare contains a heavy military element. However, the military aspect of
irregular warfare is not and does not have to be kept to operations and engagements against
enemy military forces. This section will analyze three military indicators of success: military
armament, tactics, and safe havens. Military armament will discuss and present examples of
Hezbollah’s military armament. Tactics will explain Hezbollah’s military tactics, operations,
and overall strategy. Finally, safe haven will delve into Hezbollah’s access to a crucial need of
guerilla organizations, a safe haven.
4.1 Indicator 7: Military Armament
The military armaments of Hezbollah are a mixture of classic guerrilla/irregular arms and
more advanced conventional arms. In the realm of classic irregular arms, Hezbollah extensively
uses small arms and light weapons. However, due to aide from both Syria and Iran, Hezbollah
has access to explosives ordinance in the form of bomb-making materials and rocket and mortarbased artillery. There exists strong evidence that Hezbollah’s use of explosives and artillery play
a major role in their fighting against Israel. These weapons did not take a physical toll on IDF
forces. Although IDF casualties did occur, the threat of these weapons had the greater effect.
Bombs: Hezbollah made extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Based
on data taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), out of 366 incidents of Hezbollah
terrorism, 246 incidents of violence directed against Israeli forces or civilians were conducted
through the use of explosives. These IEDs would be placed along patrol routes and would be
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either used as the opening of an assault on patrols or simply detonated to cause as much damage
as possible. The IEDs would be disguised as rocks. In a naturally rocky area, this provided an
effective means of camouflage. It was also incredibly cost effective—the hollow foam rocks
could be acquired at any garden store in Lebanon for around $15.105 Originally, the IEDs were
detonated by wire, so the detonator had to be close. This was doubly risky as it required
Hezbollah fighters to infiltrate, plant the bomb, and wait for a target to approach. Israel’s
countermeasure was to equip vehicles with wire-cutting attachments. When wired bombs lost
their advantage, radio detonators were used. When the IDF realized radio detonators were being
used and neutralized this advantage, Hezbollah moved on to cell phones, then a double cell
phone, then finally a photocell detonator, which is the type of sensor used for automatic doors.106
Another sophisticated IED method used by Hezbollah is what journalist Nicholas
Blanford refers to as “seven minute” bombs.107 A “seven minute” bomb is actually a set of
IEDs. When the first IED detonated, it would trigger a seven minute timer in the second. The
idea was that within seven minutes, the IDF or SLA patrol hit by the first IED would have
recovered and began treating the wounded and then would get hit again by the second IED.
Another tactic with these bombs was to place a decoy IED where it would be easily detected. As
the first IED was being disarmed, a nearby, more hidden bomb would detonate.108
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Artillery: Hezbollah’s other major armament is their varied supply of artillery rockets.
Hezbollah’s most famous artillery weapons are their BM-21 Grad rockets, more commonly
known as Katyusha rockets, acquired from both Iran and Syria.109 The other is Hezbollah’s 81
mm and 121 mm mortars.110 Prior to the 2000 withdrawal and during the 2006 war, Hezbollah
launched thousands of rockets. These rockets were originally 107mm or 122mm short-range
Katyusha rockets with an effective range of 5 miles. The 107mm rockets, in two variations, are
able to be launched by individuals (Figure 4.1) or from the 144 Haseb-type mobile,
multi-barrel rocket launcher system provided by Iran.111 Hezbollah initially, used the individual
launch variety, allowing for fighters to set-up, launch, and retreat before Israeli counter-attacks
can be launched. In addition, the 122mm rockets have an effective range of 12 miles and, like
the 107mm, are either portable by individuals or launched from multi-barrel rocket launcher
systems, however, the 122mm go further and have larger warheads.

Figure 4.1: Single Katyusha Rockets112
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The 107mm and 122mm rockets are old staples of Hezbollah’s armament. After the 2000
withdrawal, Hezbollah began being supplied with the 240mm, 26 mile, 110 lbs. payload Fajr-3
and the 333mm, 46 mile, 385 lbs. payload Fajr-5, unlike the smaller Katyushas, the Fajrs are
solely launched from vehicle based systems. Bigger than the Fajr-5 is the Zelzal-2 SRBM
(short-range ballistic missile). The Zelzal-2 has a range of 186 miles and carries a 1322 lbs.
payload. These Zelzals were delivered to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) units in
the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. There is a possibility that the Zelzal system was beyond
Hezbollah fighters’ ability and required actual Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
oversight.113 In addition, Table 4.1 (page 78) shows what weapons were used during the July
War. As illustrated by the table, Hezbollah not only had multiple sizes of artillery rockets, but
they also had multiple anti-tank weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, and even shore-to-ship
weapons, which was used to cripple the INS Hanit, an Israeli corvette. Andrew Exum in
Hezbollah at War: A Military Assessment, states that Hezbollah fighters used the AT-3 Sagger to
attack almost all types of targets - tanks, infantry, structures, and any vehicles Israel used in its
attack.114
Hezbollah’s armaments are the weakest indicator of Hezbollah’s military strategy. While
weapons are required for warfare, the direct impact of Hezbollah’s armaments was not as
powerful as the indirect threat of these armaments. The psychological effect derived from
hidden explosives and the potential for rockets to rain down on cities had a greater impact than
the destructive capability of Hezbollah’s weapons. As stated above, the IDF only lost 200
soldiers, however, the impact on morale was of greater consequence. In actual use, Hezbollah’s
rockets were highly inaccurate. During Operations Accountability, Grapes of Wrath, and the
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Summer War, when Hezbollah perpetually launched rockets, only 45 Israeli civilians were killed
compared to over 2,000 Lebanese civilians.115 However, the rockets mere presence was enough
to affect Israeli public opinion. Hezbollah’s more advanced systems, the Zelzal and Fajrs, did
not see much use. However, the knowledge that Hezbollah has access to rockets that can reach
further into Israel than in earlier years was more effective than the actual use. The C-308 shoreto-ship missile was only used once and did not even sink the INS Hanit. However, the simple
fact Hezbollah had access to this weapon was enough for the Israelis to push their ships farther
away from the coast. Hezbollah could probably have had as much success simply through the
use of IEDs and raids, their rocket capabilities were just an added bonus. The Afghan Taliban
and the Iraqi insurgency have had great success on shaping American opinion without the use of
or access to rockets just by using IEDs and guerilla tactics.
4.2 Indicator 8: Tactics and Operations
Hezbollah’s tactics and operations are a major part of their irregular warfare strategy
against Israel—a war of attrition. This was not a novel strategy to use against Israel; Anwar
Sadat planned the use of an attrition strategy for the conduct of the 1973 Arab-Israeli “Yom
Kippur” War:
To challenge the Israeli Security Theory by carrying out a military action according to the
capabilities of the armed forces aimed at inflicting the heaviest losses on the enemy and
convincing him that continued occupation of our land exacts a price too high for him, and
that consequently his theory of security—based as it is on psychological, political, and
military intimidation—is not an impregnable shield of steel which could protect him
today or in the future.116
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Unfortunately for Sadat, the war did not go as planned, after initial victories, Egypt and
Syria were pushed out of acquired territory and cease-fires were signed. However, the Yom
Kippur War did succeed in breaking the Israeli Security Theory, an Egyptian label for Israel’s
confidence that the IDF could deter any Arab attempts to acquire lost territory through military
actions. Israel’s spectacular success in the Six-Day War generated a national pride in the IDFs
ability to defend Israel, therefore, Israel could always engage in diplomatic matters from a
position of power.117 In three weeks of combat, 2,800 soldiers had been killed, 7,500 had been
wounded and 500 were prisoners of war.118 As a result of the war, an official investigation was
launched to find out why Israel and the IDF had been so unprepared which led to higher-thanacceptable casualties. The findings resulted in the dismissal of multiple high-ranking officers
and even the resignation of, then Prime Minister, Golda Meir in 1974.119 Because of the surprise
attack and the affliction of higher than acceptable casualties, Sadat did succeed in bringing to
light Israel’s weakness, in a state with a small population, avoidable deaths matter.
The impact of avoidable deaths and unacceptably high casualties on Israel’s domestic
politics, whether understood by Hezbollah’s founding leadership or taught to them by Iran,
would result in Hezbollah’s implementation and utilization of Sadat’s strategy with a vengeance.
Hezbollah’s understanding of this effect on Israel is reflected in Naim Qassem’s statement that:
“when an Israeli soldier is killed, senior Israeli officials begin crying over his death…Their point
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of departure is preservation of life, while our point of departure is preservation of principle and
sacrifice. What is the value of a life of humiliation?”120
Hezbollah’s actions against Israeli soldiers were two-fold: to inflict physical damage to
the Israeli occupation force and, as a result of these attacks, decrease morale in the military and
more importantly in the Israeli population. These goals were carried out through Hezbollah’s
overall strategy intended to undermine the Israel forces’ sense of security. Qassem describes a
successful resistance operation as “that achieved the wounding, death or expulsion of the post’s
occupiers, and not necessarily one that resulted in reclamation of the target post.”121
4.2.1 Operational Doctrine
Hezbollah was strongly influenced by the works of Mao and Lawrence, as well as the
histories of previous irregular struggles against superior forces. This is made evident in
Hezbollah’s battlefield doctrine. Recreated and labeled as the “13 Principles of Warfare,” by
the Jerusalem Report, the principles were published on March 21, 1996:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Avoid the strong, attack the weak - attack and withdraw!
Protecting our fighters is more important than causing enemy casualties!
Strike only when success is assured!
Surprise is essential to success. If you are spotted, you've failed!
Don't get into a set-piece battle. Slip away like smoke, before the enemy can drive home his
advantage!
Attaining the goal demands patience, in order to discover the enemy's weak points!
Keep moving, avoid formation of a front line!
Keep the enemy on constant alert, at the front and in the rear!
The road to the great victory passes through thousands of small victories!
Keep up the morale of the fighters, avoid notions of the enemy's superiority!
The media has innumerable guns, whose hits are like bullets. Use them in the battle!
The population is a treasure - nurture it!
Hurt the enemy, and then stop before he abandons restraint!122
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The use of these principles gave Hezbollah an advantage over the cumbersome,
conventional Israeli military. These principles show the true depth of how Hezbollah
understands the conduct of irregular warfare - their military strength would manifest through
prolonged engagement. Hezbollah even adhered to both Lawrence and Mao’s principles, from
Lawrence’s thesis - mobility (Principles 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13), time (Principles 6 and 9), protection of
fighters (Principles 2, 5, 7), and loyalty of the population (Principle 12).
In the spirit of Mao, the population was to be protected and nurtured (Principle 12) and
with the help of technological advancements, Principle 11—the use of the media as a weapon,
would fit precisely in both Lawrence and Mao’s ideas of conducting irregular warfare. By both
protecting the civilian population and continuously promoting Hezbollah’s ideology and
information, Hezbollah learned from Mao’s teachings and used those teachings in their strategy.
In a 2006 New York Times interview, Hezbollah’s commander in the south, Sheik Nabil Qaouk
stated: “By limiting the firing, we were able to keep the cards in our hands…We were able to do
small, little battles where we had the advantage.”123
Ultimately, this doctrine allowed Hezbollah to achieve four objectives, in Qassem’s
opinion: 1) through unpredictable attacks, Israeli forces were forced to be on high states of alert
for extended periods of time leading to fatigue and a decrease in overall combat effectiveness; 2)
the ever-present threat of attack drained troop morale and also decreased combat effectiveness;
3) Hezbollah attacks limited the ability for Israeli forces to expand into new territory by ensuring
already occupied territory was not safe; 4) the eventual reclamation of Lebanese lands from
Israeli forces.124
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4.2.2 Unit Organization and Operational Security
The majority of Hezbollah fighters are civilians with civilian jobs, though all fighters are
given the same basic training. This training is divided into four sections: hand-to-hand combat,
marksmanship, medical support, and weaponry. A recruit’s strengths and weaknesses during
training determine which of four combat groupings they are assigned. The groups are: martyrs,
those willing to execute suicide operations; commandos or special forces, which contains
fighters that have been distinguished in their knowledge and execution of guerilla warfare; rocket
launcher operators, these fighters have experience in all weapons systems, especially surface-tosurface and surface-to-air rockets and mortars; and the final grouping is for regular fighters, who
mainly perform surveillance, logistics, and medical support, but, if required, conduct attacks.125
Hezbollah uses a decentralized cell-based combat structure. Combat groups operate
independently from one another, unless an operation needs to combine groups, and the identities
of members of combat groups are kept secret from one another. This allows not only for the
quick and easy retreat of fighters, but if captured fighters do not have information on other
combat groups or the operational activities of other groups. Not all fighters are full-time. In the
varying estimation of Hezbollah’s troop strength, only hundreds are full-time as opposed to the
estimated thousands that are part-time or reservists. This structure also permits fighters to
disperse once an operation has been complete, effectively halting any chance the IDF had of
capturing individuals. The rank and file Hezbollah fighters are not involved with the operational
planning. Operational planning is conducted by a small cadre and this cadre only consists of
those directly involved with planning and execution of operations, limiting the possibility of the
leaking of operational details.

125

Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 71.

63

4.2.3 The “Rules of the Game”
A series of “rules” had emerged between Hezbollah and Israel. When Hassan Nasrallah
became Secretary-General in 1992 after his predecessor Abbas al-Musawi was assassinated,
Nasrallah laid out a very specific policy: if Lebanese civilian targets are hit by Israel, Hezbollah
will hit Israel.126 Hezbollah’s only long-range capability came from their initial Katyusha
rockets, thus if Israel hit civilians within Lebanon, Hezbollah would hit Israeli civilians with
their rockets. This strategy was particularly useful as Hezbollah fighters would attack IDF or
SLA personnel, Israel would retaliate against civilian areas, harming civilians, which would then
cause Hezbollah to retaliate against Israeli forces. This basically created a tit-for-tat retaliation
cycle between Hezbollah and the IDF.
The initial rules were in effect until the Israel commencement of two punitive campaigns,
Operation Accountability in July 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996. Both
campaigns were meant to put pressure on the Lebanese and Syrian governments to reign in
Hezbollah. Accountability was ended with an unwritten, oral agreement brokered by, then
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. In this oral agreement, Israel would not attack civilian
targets in Lebanon and Hezbollah would not fire rockets into northern Israel.127 Operation
Grapes of Wrath ended with the written, but unsigned April Understanding. The agreement
prohibited Hezbollah from launching attacks against Israel and Israel would not target civilians
or civilian targets in Lebanon. Civilian areas and infrastructure cannot be used to launch attacks
and a monitoring group consisting of the US, France, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel would be
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established to ensure adherence to the Understanding.128 Nowhere in either agreement was
attacking Israeli soldiers within the security zone prohibited. The addition of an international
monitoring group gave, de facto, legitimacy of the “rules.” Violations did occur on both sides,
but Hezbollah seemed to have become the better of the two in conducting effective operations
within the “rules,” reducing the casualty ratio of Hezbollah to IDF/SLA from 5:1 to 2:1 in
1995.129 An Israeli spokesman even discussed Israeli casualties in Lebanon as being “within the
rules.”130
It is highly likely that the 13 Principles were developed as a result the “rules” as, at least, the
public release date of the 13 Principles came one month before Operation Grapes of Wrath.
4.2.4 Martyrdom Operations
Martyrdom operations, more commonly known as suicide terrorism, were an initial
mainstay of Hezbollah’s early strategy. Most suicide operations were conducted during the
Lebanese Civil War period from 1982-1990. Ami Pedahzur counts 34 suicide operations from
1982 to 1988 with a total of 745 fatalities and 761 wounded.131 Operations were conducted
against multiple forces within Lebanon. Some operations were conducted to shock foreign
military forces into leaving Lebanon and others were to inflict damage against Israel. The most
famous examples from this period include the very first suicide bombing, the November 11th,
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1982 suicide truck bomb that exploded at the Israeli military headquarters in Tyre; 132 the April
1983 suicide bombing of the US embassy in Lebanon; and the October 1983 attacks on both the
US Marine barracks and French barracks in Beirut, which resulted in the combined withdrawal
of US and French peacekeeping forces from Lebanon. After 1990, Hezbollah conducted two
suicide operations that demonstrated the global reach of the organization and more potently, that
no matter Israel’s defense program along the border, Hezbollah could potentially strike anywhere
Israelis live. These two attacks were the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires,
Argentina and, also in Argentina, the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center.
The decline in suicide operations is attributed to the ending of the Lebanese Civil War
and Hezbollah’s entrance into the Lebanese democratic process and elections.133 At this point,
operationally, Hezbollah shifted into more of a guerilla warfare organization. The change from
terrorism to guerilla operations helped legitimize the resistance efforts. The resistance
operations would be attributed to the use of arms and the fighting spirit of Hezbollah, not the
incredibly violent and shocking effect of the use of suicide operations. This is not to say suicide
operations are not conducted, but they are used sparingly and only under certain circumstances.
4.2.5 Kidnappings
Another operational tool of Hezbollah is the use of kidnapping, which were, like suicide
operations, more prevalent and more intensely covered during the civil war period. Kidnappings
during this period also served the same purpose of the suicide operations—to shock the civilian
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population of interfering countries. In this time period, 17 Americans, 15 Frenchmen, 14
Britons, 7 Swiss, 7 West Germans, and 27 others from various states were kidnapped.134 Postcivil war kidnappings seem to have taken a more hostage-ransom aspect. IDF or SLA (South
Lebanon Army) soldiers would be kidnapped in exchange for the release of Palestinian or
Hezbollah fighters.135 It should also be noted that the kidnappings do not always result in the
trade of living IDF personnel. Hezbollah has kidnapped and killed IDF personal and held their
bodies for ransom. The assumption is that the families of the killed soldiers would put pressure
on the government to make a deal so they can bury their family members in a timely fashion, as
per Jewish tradition. This mode of kidnapping was the catalyst for the outbreak of war between
Israel and Hezbollah in the July 2006. The use of kidnapping adds to the IDF sense of unease as
not only could there be impending fire fights, but the soldiers could be kidnapped and either kept
alive until demands are met or they are executed and their corpses are used as a bargaining tool.
4.2.6 The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War
The 2006 Summer War saw a marked difference in Hezbollah’s military strategy.
Hezbollah was to engage in a defensive war. After Prime Minister Ehud Olmert laid out Israel’s
goals for the war— destroy Hezbollah, cease the rocket attacks into northern Israel, and free the
two captured soldiers; Hezbollah’s objective was to simply prevent Israel from achieving these
objectives by enduring the assault, ensuring sustainability of rocket attacks, and to inflict as high
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a cost as possible on the IDF forces.136 In his May 25, 2000 victory speech, Nasrallah declared
“‘Israel’ which owns nuclear weapons and the strongest war aircraft in the region, is feebler than
a spider's web.”137 Nasrallah saw the impact Hezbollah’s war of attrition had on Israel society,
and having observed the Israeli conduct of Operations Accountability and Grapes of Wrath, he
understood that when it came to major Israeli retaliatory action, Israel would focus mainly on
precision air-strikes and not risk the lives of soldiers.138
Soon after the Israeli pullout, Hezbollah began building extensive tunnel and bunker
networks (Figure 4.2) in preparation for this defensive war. These networks were established as
stationary rocket launcher positions. The bunkers would provide cover and protection from
Israeli strikes. Andrew Exum on his visit to the area saw “in one spot, south of Naqoura and
within view of both the Mediterranean and the Israeli border, a Hizballah position with eighteen
inches of concrete overhead cover had been built a mere 20 meters from a UNIFIL position and
just 100 meters from an IDF position.”139 The bunker system included electrical wiring,
reinforced concrete firing positions, water, food, and ammo, enough to maintain a functional
bunker for extended periods of time.140
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Figure 4.2: Hezbollah Defensive System141

At Maroun al-Ras, where the Israelis attempted to establish a foothold, Israeli forces
encountered fierce resistance. The Israelis established control during the day, but the next
morning they were completely surrounded by Hezbollah fighters. The area around Maroun alRas had an extensive bunker and tunnel network, which one Israeli infantryman said was “…
more than 25 feet deep and contained a network of tunnels linking several large storage rooms
and multiple entrances and exits. He said it was equipped with a camera at the entrance, linked to
a monitor below to help Hezbollah fighters ambush Israeli soldiers.”142 Hezbollah’s military
strategy had entered into a new unique grey area—they are an irregular force that began utilizing
very regular strategies and weapons. That is not to say the completely abandoned their 13
Principles, as mentioned earlier, but they still kept the loyalty of the population, which permitted
the establishment of bunkers and weapon caches throughout the area.
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Hezbollah did not necessarily have an established front line, thus there was never a
definitive push back in any kind of retreat, however, fighters would stop fighting but not
necessarily vacate the battlefield. Timur Goksul, former spokesman for and senior adviser to
UNIFIL, commented, “For a guy fighting in Ayta ash Shab (Aita al-Shaab), ‘withdrawal’ means
going home, putting your AK-47 under the bed and changing your clothes.”143
Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman in The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future
of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy explain that Hezbollah, instead of
uniformly attempting to hold the front, actually allowed swaths of territory to be taken without
resistance, but some areas would be defended in hours long firefights that did not end until every
last fighter was killed, a tactic unheard of for a guerilla force.144 This tactical decision may, in
fact, be based off Hezbollah’s strategic choice on how to stop the Israelis—the uninterrupted
launching of short-range rockets.
The Israeli Air Force (IAF) had successfully destroyed or negated Hezbollah’s longer
range missiles. This left only the short range rockets capable of putting pressure on the Israelis
as a result the established rocket bunkers had to be defending long enough for rockets to land and
built political pressure within and outside Israel, thus Hezbollah had to adopt non-guerilla tactics
in order to hold out long enough.145 Interestingly, in August 2007, Nasrallah admitted “the
resistance withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage a guerrilla war either . . . it was
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not a regular army but was not a guerrilla in the traditional sense either. It was something in
between. This is the new model.”146
Hezbollah’s tactics and operations are also a strong indicator of military success. The
ascension of Hassan Nasrallah to the Secretary-Generalship of the group fundamentally changed
how Hezbollah would operate. Hezbollah transformed from a group that was feared, due to its
fanaticism and use of terrorism, by both Lebanese and Israelis, into an armed movement that
promoted popular resistance to Israeli occupation. As a result, Hezbollah essentially
professionalized the Islamic Resistance with emphasis placed on the training of capable,
competent forces, not self-sacrificing fanatics. This is not to say Hezbollah relaxed on their
religious devotion, religiosity was actually a major trait required in recruits. In fact, prior to
receiving any military training, recruits are given religious training and guidance on overcoming
the Greater Jihad, discussed in Section 1, as jihad is considered:
to be a basic behavior in a Muslim’s life, be it a jihad with one’s soul or a struggle against
the enemy. The second form of struggle is the more difficult practical evidence of the
concept and comes only after fulfillment of the first, only after man shuns his wants and
prepares himself for practical confrontation with oppressors and occupants.147
This new professionalism manifested in the effectiveness of operations—soldier
kidnappings, assaults on positions, IED placement, etc. As the amount of operations conducted,
Israeli morale decreased. As Hezbollah IEDs destroyed or damaged equipment and personnel,
Israeli morale decreased. These operations and IED success created an atmosphere of a constant
threat and a sense of dread reducing soldiers’ combat effectiveness. Hezbollah’s adherence to
and exploitation of the “rules,” allowed Hezbollah to attack and kill soldiers, provoking a
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response from Israel, usually by artillery, against civilians permitted Hezbollah’s launching of
rockets, which then scared Israeli civilians. The civilians eventual demoralization, through
constant threat of attack and the deaths of soldiers, turned into dissention and political pressure
on elected officials.
A Gallup/Ma’ariv poll in April 2000, one month before the withdrawal, 53% of the
population polled supported a unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon.148 In the end, more
Hezbollah fighters, 1248, and Lebanese civilians were killed in the 18 years of occupation than
IDF personnel, 200, or Israeli citizens.149 However, due to the Israeli population’s sensitivity to
casualties, the total population of Israel only grew by 2.258 million between 1982 and 2000, the
death of 200 soldiers to hold a strip of land was unacceptable.150 The election of Ehud Barak to
Prime Minister, who campaigned on withdrawal, resulted in Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from
Lebanon and as IDF personnel were leaving, villagers came in to resettle the once occupied
territory. In addition to those villagers, Hezbollah moved into the south to almost immediately
established the military infrastructure seen in the 2006 Summer War.
4.3 Indicator 9: Safe Haven
Hezbollah’s utilization of Lebanon as a safe haven is an important aspect of Hezbollah’s
strategy. Hezbollah operates within the international boundary of the state of Lebanon,
specifically within south Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa Valley and within Beirut, the capital. By
operating within a sovereign state and in territory under its control, Hezbollah has a safe haven.
The use of a safe haven allows Hezbollah both a secure operational area and a propaganda tool.
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Operating within a safe haven permits Hezbollah to acquire weapons, train soldiers, and devise
operations with impunity from Israeli reprisals. While Hezbollah controlled areas or positions
can still be attacked by Israel, when Israel performs these kinetic operations, they violate the
national sovereignty of Lebanon, which can lead to international condemnation for Israel.
Quite possibly the strongest example of Hezbollah’s advantage in the use of Lebanon as a
safe haven comes from IDF released photographs of Hezbollah installations in south Lebanon
published in The Washington Post. Figure 4.3 was taken in 2011, five years after the 2006
Israel-Hezbollah War. From this photo, evidence is provided that in the five years since the
conflict, Hezbollah has been able to rebuild their previous support network. The bunkers created
are not simply holes in the ground with sandbags. If they are like the 2006 bunkers, they are
concrete structures built deep into the ground with tunnel networks, ammo rooms, supply rooms,
etc. capable of withstanding sustained attacks by the Israelis.
The IDF says that these facilities are located across 270 villages and that these
facilities are placed near hospitals, homes, and schools.151 More disturbing is that the terms of
UN Security Council Resolution 1701 calls for UNIFIL and the Lebanese government forces to
be the only armed entities south of the Litani River.152 In Figure 4.3, the Litani River is the most
south heavy blue line and Israel’s border is where the colored dots stops. Figure 4.4 is al-Khaim
village. This village houses multiple weapon facilities and underground sites. Also stationed in
al-Khaim are more than 100 Hezbollah fighters prepared to battle Israel whenever called upon. 153
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Figure 4.3: Hezbollah Facilities 2011154
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Figure 4.4: Al-Khaim Village, 2011155

Prior to the establishment of these static defense systems and caches, Hezbollah enjoyed
the chaos of a civil war, a significant amount of loyalty from the population in southern Lebanon,
southern Beirut, and the Bekaa Valley in western Lebanon, all areas historically Shi’a
dominated, and the consent of the Lebanese government as seen in Section 1. These factors have
given Hezbollah, throughout its history, a vast safe haven for development and execution of
operations against Israel. The chaos that resulted from an outbreak of civil war permitted
Hezbollah to operate without a significant response to their actions. While there was a Lebanese
government and a Lebanese military, the loss of the monopoly of power, neutered the Lebanese
government and military from taking direct action on Hezbollah. If Hezbollah had to be
concerned with domestic checks to their power, it would have come from other militias.
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However, the different militias were busy either fighting each other, did not care what Hezbollah
did, were deterred from attacking Hezbollah, or could not actually target Hezbollah fighters or
leaders due to Hezbollah’s initial secretive nature.
As discussed in Section 3, Hezbollah works and maintains a positive with the population
within their areas of control. As a result of this work, Hezbollah has been able to use houses
within loyal villages to store weapons, house fighters, or even launch rocket attacks or
operations.156 This was seen extensively in the 2006 war. When asked about Hezbollah’s use of
civilian areas, retired Lebanese Army general Elias Hanna said:
Of course there are hidden invisible tunnels, bunkers of missile launchers, bunkers of
explosive charges amongst civilians….You cannot separate the southern society from
Hezbollah, because Hezbollah is the society and the society is Hezbollah. Hezbollah is
holding this society together through its political, military and economic services. It is
providing the welfare for the south.157
Additionally, in the Bekaa Valley in western Lebanon on the border with Syria are some
of Hezbollah’s training camps. At these camps, Hezbollah recruits are given religious
indoctrination and military training. In the time of Hezbollah’s inception, this training was
conducted by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps military advisors.158 From the Bekaa,

156

In an interview, a captured Hezbollah fighter stated that the village of Aita al-Shaab was completely
empty and the houses were either left open or keys were provided to Hezbollah for full use of the houses for the
needs of Hezbollah. This fighter and another operative stayed in the houses of two brothers. One house was used to
store the rockets the operatives brought with them; the other house was used to sleep in order to provide protection
in case the rockets detonated. The captured fighter could name the owner of a house that was used to store anti-tank
guided missiles, he additionally knew of storage sites within Aita al-Shaab for weapons including machine guns and
RPGs. This and additional interviews can be found at
http://www.ajcongress.org/site/PageServer?pagename=humanshields, accessed July 5, 2012.
157

Greg Myre, “Offering Video, Israel Answers Critics of War,” The New York Times, December 5, 2006,
accessed July 5, 2012
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/world/middleeast/05mideast.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ei=5088&en=b8b25a
9e380122ff&ex=1322974800&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss
158

The number of initial advisors varies; Byman estimates around 1500 members, see Daniel Byman, “The
Lebanese Hizballah and Israeli Counterterrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 12 (2011): 920;
Ranstorp and Katzman state 2,000, see Magnus Ranstorp, “The Hizballah Training Camps of Lebanon” found in
The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Vol. 2, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport:

76

Hezbollah fighters are provided basic training and subsequent specialized training in Iran.
Coupled with training, Iranian arms shipments, flown into Damascus, are thought to come into
Lebanon and into Hezbollah’s arms through the Bekaa Valley due to its close proximity to the
Syrian border.
The access to a safe haven is critical for any guerilla movement. In the absence of a safe
haven, whether in the conflicted state or sanctuary found in an adjacent host state, the guerilla
forces are vulnerable to attack and have no ability to recuperate or plan. That is why the denial
of safe havens is central to counterinsurgency efforts. In the case of Hezbollah, the IDF or
Israeli diplomats were never able to successfully deny Hezbollah a safe haven. Hezbollah was
able to operate unhindered in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and in the Lebanese side of the security
zone.
As is true for any militant group, what kind of arms, how those arms are used, and being
able to safely use those arms is paramount to success. Hezbollah has been able to utilize each of
those aspects in their military campaign against Israel. This utilization is what has made them
both vilified and idolized around the world. In Western countries and Israel, Hezbollah is an
example of the level of sophistication and success that a terrorist group can attain. In September
2002, then Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage went so far as to suggest that in regards
to lethality, “Hezbollah may be the A team of terrorists and al-Qaeda is actually the B-team.”159
This designation of Hezbollah’s lethality can only be derived from Hezbollah’s military
competency and this competency can only make the group more effective and more lethal.

Praeger Security International, 2006), 248 and Wege says 1,000, see Carl Anthony Wege, “Hizballah Organization,”
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 17, no.2 (1994): 155.
159

Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah be Next?” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (Nov-Dec 2003): 55.

77

Assessment
Having presented research and evidence concerning the three indicators of military success
(military armaments, tactics and operations, and safe haven) in the most basic and strict sense of
what should contribute to military success, Hezbollah’s tactics and operations should be the most
important indicator, however, it is not. Contrary to comparative amounts of evidence for each,
the strongest indicator of Hezbollah’s military success is the access to a safe haven, their tactics
and operations are also strong, and their military armament is the weakest.
Even if Hezbollah was expelled from these areas, in all actuality, Israel is in a no win
situation. If access to Lebanese safe havens could have been successfully removed, Hezbollah
would have been able to operate out of Syria at the time, which would probably have been more
difficult to combat. The Golan Heights would have been a prime target or Hezbollah could just
infiltrate back into Lebanon, plant an IED, and promptly exfiltrate. The removal of a Lebanese
safe haven would have been a temporary measure as maintenance of the removal would have
required cooperation between the IDF and Lebanese army (which the Lebanese government was
essentially a puppet of Syria) to guard the borders.
The other option for a new, primary safe haven would have been Iran. If Hezbollah was
based out of Iran, Hezbollah could have possibly never abandoned suicide operations. The
necessity to balance the use of suicide operations against a domestic population would have been
removed. Hezbollah would not have to worry about alienating sections of a population they
proclaim to represent and defend. Using of Iranian embassies and diaspora communities,
Hezbollah could have conducted more attacks like those on the Israeli embassy and the Jewish
community center in Argentina. Of course, these are assumptions based off research, if
Hezbollah was denied a safe haven; the group would have either ceased to exist or would have
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taken on a different form, possibly an al-Qaeda type flat network of loose affiliates and
franchises. However, as Section 5 will discuss, even with the removal of a safe haven, the
movement very likely would have been sustained through economic support
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Table 4.1 Weapons Used by Hezbollah during the July War 160

Type
Surface-to-surface
rockets; short
range (0-25km)
Surface-tosurface; mid to
long range
(>25km)

Shore-to-ship
missiles

Name

Caliber
(millimeters)

Maximum
Range
(kilometers)

Katyusha

122

20

"Extended-range"
katyusha

122

35

New version of standard
katyusha

Fajr-3

240

43

12 barrels, truck mounted
launcher

Uragon

220

70

Syrian-made

Fajr-5

333

75

4 barrels, truck-mounted
launcher

Khaiber-1

302

100

Syrian-or Chinese-made

Zelzal-2

610

210

Launch attempted; did not
hit Israel

C-701

15

Television guidance

C-802 Noor

120

Onboard active homing

Comments

Hizballah version of Iranian
Mohjar-4; three flown
during conflict
Shoulder-fired, tandem
warhead

Unmanned aerial
vehicles

Mirsad-1

Antitank missiles

RPG-29

105

0.5

AT-13 Metis-M

130

2

Tandem warhead

AT-4 Spigot

120

2

Wire-guided semi-automatic
command to line of sight
(SACLOS)

AT-3 Sagger

125

3

Wire-guided SACLOS

TOW
AT-5 Spandrel

3.75
135

AT-14 Kornet-E

160

4
5

American-made
Tandem shaped-charge
warhead
SACLOS guidance

Recreation of table found in Exum, “Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment,” 6.

80

Section 5: Economics
The access to financing is crucial for non-state actors engaged in irregular warfare. This
section will analyze the economic indicators of success: legal/illegal income sources, state
sponsorship, and Shi’a diaspora donations.
5.1 Indicator 10: Legal/illegal sources of income
Hezbollah has a wide and varying array of income sources. Some are legal and some are
illegal. Martin Rudner points to seven sources of income for Hezbollah: charitable fundraising,
legitimate commercial activity, tax-like levies, criminal activity, financial defalcation,
government transfers, and cross-subsidies.161 While Rudner has labeled these examples as legal
and illegal, the legal sources are generally seen as fronts for the funding of the Resistance.
5.1.1 Legal
5.1.1.1 Charitable fundraising: Hezbollah solicits donations to help fund the various
social service agencies conducted by Hezbollah. A major source of these donations come from
Shi’a neighborhoods with collection boxes in public areas and donation boxes found in family
homes, where families can recommend other families to receive a donation box.162 Additionally
Hezbollah utilizes the internet for donations. Through the use of multiple websites Hezbollah
displays account numbers which individuals can give to Lebanese banks in order to donate
money. The major Hezbollah organs which use websites for donations include the Martyr’s
Foundation, Jihad al-Binaa Organization, and The Support Association of the Islamic Resistance
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in Lebanon.163 While advertised as helping these organizations, funds are known to be redirected
into the acquisition of arms.
5.1.1.2 Zakat: Hezbollah has access to tithes or zakat.164 Politically, Hezbollah is
identified as a religious organization that is entitled to tithes of one-fifth of a constituent’s
income a practice intended for charity, whether zakat is given directly to Hezbollah or given to
Hezbollah sponsored mosques is unknown. According to the Meir Amit Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center, Ayatollah Khomeini authorized the allocation of zakat into
support for the Palestinians. Hezbollah uses these to acquire weapons and help train Palestinians,
as Hezbollah has taken up the Palestinian struggle as one-in-the-same to Hezbollah’s goals.165
5.1.2 Illegal
5.1.2.1 Shakedowns: In 2002, Jeffrey Goldberg in his article “In the Party of God” in
The New Yorker traveled to the Tri-Border Area (where Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil meet)
and was told about Hezbollah officials would enter shops owned by Lebanese immigrants and
give them a paper thanking them for their donation, which would then have an amount written on
the paper. If the amount was not paid, the shop owner would be warned, their family in Lebanon
would be warned, and, in case of noncompliance, rumors would be spread that the shop owner
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and his family were a spies for Israel. If and when the amount was paid, the paper would be
placed in the window and the shop keeper would be left alone until the next month.166
5.1.2.2 Criminal Activity: Hezbollah is reported to benefit from the cultivation of poppy
in the Bekaa Valley, which the shipping of this is used to buy information from Israeli-Arabs.167
Furthermore, there is evidence of a partnership between Hezbollah and the FARC in Colombia.
Hezbollah can get ship drugs and the FARC provides weapons.168 Hezbollah was also reported
to have been a party to shipping of “conflict” or blood diamonds.169 Other criminal activities
include human smuggling, drugs and arms trafficking, trade in contraband, money-laundering,
forging travel documents, and financial fraud.170 An example of terrorism linked criminal
activity was Operation Smokescreen in 2002. Operation Smokescreen was a United States
interagency sting operation against Lebanese-born brothers, Mohammed and Chawki Hamoud in
North Carolina. This sting was set to halt the sale of untaxed cigarettes. Through the sale of
untaxed cigarettes, this North Carolina cell was able to raise millions of dollars and acquired
items in Canada and the U.S. and smuggle these items into Lebanon. These items include nightvision goggles, global positioning systems, stun guns, naval equipment, nitrogen cutters and laser
range finders.171
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Much of Hezbollah’s criminal activity is based out of the Tri-Border Area where the
borders of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina meet, is essentially an ungoverned, lawless area
where international organized criminal elements operate with little or no threat from law
enforcement. It was reported by the Naval War College, that Hezbollah receives close
$10,000,000 a year from the Tri-Border Area.172
Hezbollah’s access to both legal and illegal income sources has provided Hezbollah with
a wide variety of sources for income. This has allowed Hezbollah to maintain a public face as a
legal organization with good intentions, while using their expatriate communities to run illegal
operations ranging from drug running to shakedowns of commercial businesses. These sources
of income allow for Hezbollah to make up the projected 300 million to 400 million difference
between their financial needs and the money supplied by Iran.
5.2 Indicator 11: State sponsorship
The major source of income for Hezbollah comes from the aide received from both Syria
and Iran. The evidence points to while the direct monetary amounts provided to Hezbollah are
not as significant as the income acquired through both legal and illegal means, the economic aide
provided by Syria and Iran comes in the form of free weapons and training. Armament and
training of Hezbollah’s fighters, both active and reserve forces, is easily in the hundreds of
millions. Through the aide provided by Syria and Iran, Hezbollah does not need to raise these
considerable amounts of money. The range of monetary support Hezbollah receives from Iran
specifically is between $50 million and $200 million.173 This is in addition to the equivalent
amounts of training, arms transfers, and other support provided to Hezbollah from Iran. The
same issue arises when attempting to quantify Syrian support—placing a real dollar amount on
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support provided by Syria is problematic. However, the number has to be at in the same range as
Iran’s monetary support.
While the amount of evidence for state sponsorship is short, the impact of having two
states willing to provide not only money, but weapons and training is a major source of
economic security for Hezbollah. By freeing up much of the cost associated with military
organizations, Iran and Syria have allowed Hezbollah more money to devote to their social
service and “hearts and minds” campaigns—campaigns almost, if not more important, than the
military aspects of irregular warfare.
5.3 Indicator 12: Shi’a Diaspora Donations
There is no evidence of any specific amounts of funding provided to Hezbollah through
Shi’a diaspora community donations. However, as described in Indicator 10, donations to
Hezbollah are a major source of income for the organization.
This indicator has the same situation as Indicator 11: State Sponsorship. This indicator
suffers from a lack of evidence producing monetary figures of how much Shi’a diaspora
donations contribute to Hezbollah’s economics. However, as discussed in Indicator 10,
donations through Hezbollah’s charities contribute highly to Hezbollah’s social programs and
military programs.
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Section 6: Conclusion
The research question for this thesis is: To what extent was Hezbollah successful in their
use of irregular warfare against Israel? In answering this question, evidence was provided that
showed how Hezbollah used the instruments of power to execute a campaign of hybrid warfare
against Israel. Based on the evidence presented, Hezbollah was highly successful in their use of
hybrid warfare against Israel due to their effective use of the instruments of power.
If the key to hybrid warfare is the amalgamation of irregular troops and tactics and
conventional arms and tactics, then not only have Hezbollah succeeded in their utilization, but it
has become the exemplar of hybrid warfare. The basis for Hezbollah’s success at hybrid warfare
is their blending of and utilization of the DIME. By successfully utilizing the instruments of
power, Hezbollah succeeded against Israel. While some indicators had more evidence, the
military and information indicators, and others had less, the diplomatic and economic indicators,
the amount of evidence is not directly related to the significance of that indicator. As ideal as it
would be to be able to list the indicators in some fashion of importance, the fact is that as the
instruments of power do not exist in a vacuum, they cannot be listed as such, certain indicators
being considered as more important than others.
The importance or prominence of indicators would be directly affected by Hezbollah’s
plans at the time. A single course or strategy of action would have, most likely, led to
Hezbollah’s failure against Israel. In being strategically rigid, Hezbollah would have lost a
hallmark of hybrid warfare—adaptability. For example, if Hezbollah wanted to apply military
pressure then tactics and operations and propaganda would be most important, as seen in the
“Who’s Next?” campaign that was accompanied by a spike in IDF casualties. Between 2000 and
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2006, Hezbollah seemingly focused on once again redefining the organization and its role in
Lebanon after the Israeli pullout, however, during that time military actions were still taken.
The most powerful instruments used by Hezbollah were the information and military
indicators. The essence of Hezbollah’s activity was active, military-based resistance to both
Israel’s occupation of Lebanon and Israel’s very existence. Thus, the strength and capability of
their military apparatus was paramount as seen in the evidence provided in Indicator 11.
Hezbollah had a robust military doctrine that promoted irregular warfare while also focusing on
the power of both the media and the population. This doctrine would provide Hezbollah with
fighters with combat experience ideally resulting in minimal loss of fighters and maximized
psychological affect against the IDF producing Israeli soldiers that were likely to high amounts
of combat stress which would increase the chance for combat accidents and reduced combat
efficiency. Additionally, Hezbollah’s access and use of conventional military weapons such as
their Katyusha arsenal and access to anti-tank missiles provided Hezbollah with the capability to
offer stand-off resistance against heavy armor and Israel’s bunker systems—two things which
provide problems for traditionally lightly armed irregular fighters.
In their use of information, Hezbollah dominated. As Hassan Nasrallah planned,
Hezbollah would wage psychological warfare and Hezbollah was able to utilize their access to
battlefield footage and their private television station, al-Manar, to produce news about
operations within hours where Israel produced information in days. In controlling the available
information and their ability to alter that information to fit their needs, Israel was never able to
catch up and gain control of the narrative within the occupied zone. This loss of control of the
narrative benefitted Hezbollah in two ways: 1) Hezbollah was able to produce footage of Israel
troops being killed or wounded and footage implying Hezbollah’s military and tactical
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superiority against the IDF and 2) This footage, while demoralizing to Israel, bolstered the spirit
of Hezbollah’s fighters and supporters. In seeing that Hezbollah can be victorious against the
once awesome IDF, support increased in order to assure Hezbollah’s victory. Hezbollah’s ability
to reinvent and remarket themselves as a national resistance movement was also a crucial aspect
of Hezbollah’s information instrument. In building bridges and forging ties with other
confessional groups, who were once enemies, Hezbollah increased their status and prestige as a
group working to ensure the safety and liberation of Lebanon from Israel and not a group
actively and violently seeking the complete reformation of Lebanon into a Iranian modeled
Islamic state.
Finally, Hezbollah’s extensive use of social service networks added to their nationalist
image. Hezbollah provides services to any confessional group, not just their Shi’a constituency.
In providing crucial medical, educational, construction, and quality of life services, Hezbollah
effectively replaced the state in their main areas of control as well as endearing themselves to the
Lebanese who benefited from these services in other parts of the country. In helping people
from other groups, Hezbollah can build a network of support throughout the state as one satisfied
customer would inform others of how much Hezbollah helped him or her and their family.
Hezbollah’s economic and diplomatic instruments are important but were not as crucial
to Hezbollah’s success. This is not meant to say that these instruments were worthless, to the
contrary, no DIME based strategy can existed without the interaction of all aspects. This means
that while the military and information instruments are the most powerful, diplomacy and
economics are comparatively weaker. This is due to the most powerful indicators of both—lack
of international pressure and state sponsorship.
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Economically, Hezbollah’s strongest indicator is state sponsorship. This indicator goes
hand-in-hand with the lack of international pressure. Hezbollah receives, annually, an estimated
amount of between $100-200 million from Iran alone. This money is in addition to training and
arms provided by both Iran and Syria. If Hezbollah did not have access to this money, and what
amounts to free weapons and training, their fight against Israel would have had to take a different
form. However, due to this support, Hezbollah was able to become a successful hybrid force
against Israel. Behind state sponsorship is Hezbollah’s own means of collecting funds through
their legal and illegal income sources.
Hezbollah’s projected operational budget is between $300-500 million. In order to make
up the difference between what they need and what Iran provides, Hezbollah has created a
system of both legal and illegal income sources. A strong source of legal income comes from
donations provided by both their Shi’a constituency, other Lebanese, and from the extensive
Lebanese diaspora communities found throughout the world. Much of these donations go
straight to funding the Islamic Resistance; however, these donations also go towards funding
Hezbollah’s social programs and providing aid to the Palestinians. As for Hezbollah’s illegal
sources of income, Hezbollah is known to extensively operate out of the Tri-Border Area of
Latin America where shakedowns of locally operated stores are known to occur in addition to
drug running and arms purchasing and selling.
In analysis of the indicators of success for diplomacy, the strongest indicator was the lack
of international pressure on Hezbollah. Hezbollah had massive amounts of leeway within
multiple states. Hezbollah operated with two state sponsors and had access to states that either
had no interest in the situation in the Middle East or had a more pro-Arab political leaning.
Much like attempting to enforce international sanctions, if one state is not will to enforce the
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sanctions and instead does business normally with the targeted state, the sanctions are weakened
or rendered moot. The same logic exists for hampering terrorist organizations. As mentioned
earlier, al-Qaeda was successfully dismantled due to multiple states willingly working toward a
common goal of stopping al-Qaeda. This unified goal does not exist in the case of Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has the backing of two states and the de facto support of the states that are either allies
or partners with Syria and Iran in addition to states or populations that are anti-Israel and see
Hezbollah as a positive force in the region.
Hezbollah’s status as a non-state actor, while legally problematic, does not necessarily
represent a major diplomatic initiative on Hezbollah’s part. While a stronger discussion on
whether Hezbollah is a state or non-state actor has occurred after the 2006 War, in terms of
resisting Israeli occupation, Hezbollah was a recognized “resistance movement” within Lebanon
that was part of internationally negotiated cease-fires giving them de facto recognition as a party
to the conflict whether state or non-state. Finally, international pressure on Israel seemed to be a
by-product of Hezbollah’s actions. Operations Accountability and Grapes of Wrath were
political nightmares for the Israeli government and came as a direct result of Hezbollah’s
military successes—Israel was Israel’s worst enemy. However, much like Hezbollah’s state
sponsorship protects them from international pressure, the United States’ sponsorship of Israel
protected Israel from most international pressure.
Through their use of the DIME, Hezbollah was successful in achieving their immediate
goals—the removal of Israel from Lebanese territory and becoming the guardian of Lebanon.
However, while Hezbollah was successful, many groups are not. By understanding Hezbollah’s
coordinated use of the DIME, states and other parties can better understand what actions aid in
success and how those actions can be countered. Combating insurgencies and rebel groups are
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long and costly battles, but if the counterinsurgent can understand the insurgent’s overall strategy
and how that strategy is implemented, the battles may not have to be so long and costly.
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